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CHAPTER 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The trinity of cost scales that reward activity, fear of being sued for negligence and an
adversary based litigation process drive lawyers to leave no stone unturned in litigation at a
cost to the parties that is beyond their ability to pay and which often overwhehns the
amount of the actual dispute. "Every system contains a percentage of errors; and if by
slightly increasing the percentage of error we can substantially reduce the percentage of
cost it is only the idealist who will revolt."^ The idealists have reason to be cautious. A
cheap efficient system may contain the seeds of a different set of problems. The German
experience suggests that too great an efficiency coupled with certain and ftill cost recovery
can lead to excessive litigation. This may not increase access to justice by the needy but
rather may fiirther empower the powerful.^ This causes a substantial expense to the
community both in publicly funded judicial expenses which are much higher per capita
than is the norm in Europe and in legal resources generally. The United States of America
has moved towards judicial case management and the promotion of alternatives to
adjudication but there remains a strong thread in the literature of that country in defence of
the adversary trial process. The judicial process as we know it is best at dispute resolution
by trial. It is open, has safeguards and is perceived by litigants as carefiil, unbiased and
dignified. It generates a body of decided cases to guide future disputants. It is said that its
procedures express our value structure and once engaged it ensures that society's interests
are protected in any resolution of the dispute.^ If litigants are forced to resolve disputes by
methods outside that process (mediation and other alternative dispute resolution- 'ADR')
that involves a dilution of the protection that the trial process offers and calls into question
the very need to have the judiciary. Although they are uniquely empowered and tramed in
the trial process that is not so with ADR.

In introducing reforms to save costs, care must be taken to ensure that today's solutions do
not become tomorrow's problems and that the virtues of the present system are not
^ Lord Devlm in the BBC series "What's wrong with the law". This is quoted at greater
length within the discussion of the Woolf interim report Access to Justice chapter 3 under
the heading "civil litigation in England and Wales".
^ See A continental European perspective in chapter 3.
^ Seethe United States of American experience in chapter 3.

discarded.

The Magistrates Court (civil division) in South Australia has introduced several policies
aimed at limiting and reducing costs. It has not designed its pretrial processes just as a
linear track cuhninating in a well ordered adversary trial because in fact less than ten
percent of defended cases will need a trial. Litigants are given multiple exit points from
the litigation process, including court annexed mediation as an alternative to the
conventional litigation. The court has certain and predictable party/party costs and seeks
to minimise pretrial procedures. Judicial input is front loaded in the process and litigants
are personally advised of the process, the costs they may incur and recover and the
alternative ways offered by the court to resolve their disputes. This is a deliberate policy
to inform the parties to enable them to have control of and to make rational decisions about
their litigation. The court has a well developed small claims jurisdiction where legal costs
are minimised by excluding lawyers from the pretrial and trial process. The effectiveness
of these policies in limiting and reducing costs to the parties has been evaluated in this
research. Some collateral implications of the parties' satisfaction with the process have
been considered.
The ninety day preaction notice rule
In personal injury litigation the first exit point occurs before the litigation is commenced.
The State Government Insurance Commission in South Australia (called herein SGIC- the
fiind is now owned by the Motor Accident Commission of SA), the compulsory third party
(CTP) insurer in SA, established a settlement conference team in an endeavour to settle
claims before legal proceedings were issued. The available data and the subjective opmion
of lawyers involved in CTP litigation show that this initiative was successful in settling a
substantial number of claims before legal proceedings were filed. A relatively high level
of respect by lawyers for the settlement conference team has contributed to the success of
the initiative.

A rule of court requiring 90 day preaction notice of an intended claim

institutionalised this approach.

The number of personal injury actions commenced in

courts in South Australia is now one quarter the number in 1989/90. Casualty accidents in
the same period have not declined substantially. This mitiative has had a dramatic effect in
allowing settlements to occur before claims were filed in court in up to three quarters of
potential cases.

Settling claims before legal proceedings were filed has resulted in a

substantial reduction in the medico legal costs incurred both by the claimants and SGIC.

The reduced level of general damages imposed by statute reduced the total payout by SGIC
and has no doubt diminished the attraction of litigating if a reasonable offer is made by
SGIC. Even allowing for these qualifications, the proactive settlement policy adopted by
SGIC, in conjunction with the rule change has resulted in plaintiffs receiving their
entitlement under the existing system earlier in the process and this has saved costs both to
them and SGIC.

This approach has been so successful that it should be considered in any specialist field
where there is a major player who can be convinced of the benefit of settling cases before
the claims commence in court. It clearly can offer dramatic cost savings to the parties by
allowing them to exit from the litigation path even before a claim is commenced in a court.
In general litigation the risk of introducing a requirement of a preaction notice is that
unless it is coincident with an intention by at least one and ideally both of the parties to
negotiate then it is likely to fail to settle many cases. It could become just an additional
step in a linear litigation process heading towards the court steps and in fact increase the
costs to the parties. To be applied successfully to litigation generally attention would have
to be given to education or other means to ensure a willingness by the parties to use the
opportunity to settle their disputes.
Information to parties and mediation
The next exit point offered to parties in general claims is at the first directions hearing
which now is conducted by a magistrate. The parties are required to attend in person, are
told about the difference in the party/party and actual cost of litigation and are offered the
option of mediation. A survey of parties showed that this information was well understood
but there is an inertia against trying mediation. The new system was highly successful in
bringing settlements forward in the litigation process. Two and a half times as many
settled by the end of the directions hearing under the new system than previously. This
clearly saved those parties substantial costs. The front end loading of judicial input in
combination with the parties being present and better mformed were the reasons for this
successful result. Parties were generally happy with the opportunity offered to discuss the
case at this early stage. Repeat users of the court and their lawyers were not in favour of

the requirement that the parties attend in person. Only 4.5% of parties jomtly chose
mediation. At the time of data collection about half those had settled with indications that
figure may rise up to a maximum of three quarters.

Parties interviewed who tried

mediation were very happy with the procedural fairness of mediation even where they
were unhappy with the outcome. This contrasted with parties interviewed who had gone to
trial who were only satisfied with the procedural fairness of the trial if they won. There
was a concern about the enforceability of mediated settlements and further attention is
necessary to ensure that these are framed in a way that makes them easy to enforce as a
judgment if a party defaults.

The other notable change was that 15% of cases went straight from the directions hearing
to trial. If these were correctly identified as cases that could only be finalised with a trial
date this reduced delay and was a small cost saving to the parties.

Insisting that parties attend in person at the first directions hearing which is conducted by a
magistrate, who gives them clear information about the costs of litigation and the option of
mediation, has been successful in giving the parties an early exit point. Only a small
percentage chose mediation but it is a useful alternative and was well accepted as a process
by those who did choose it.

Alternative adjudication- the small claims procedure
The small clauns procedure excludes lawyer involvement once the claim is filed and
defended. That clearly reduces the costs to the parties. Until recently the procedure was to
list claims for hearing at which a magistrate made attempts to settle them. If that failed the
magistrate determmed them by an inquisitorial process.

This dual role often caused

complaints by the parties. A directions hearing before the trial has been successful in
fmalising an extra 25% of cases without the need of a trial and has clarified the role of the
trial magistrate. This saved those parties some costs but the rest who went to trial were
put to the expense of an additional attendance. It has reduced delay. The parties who
settled at the fu-st directions hearing were very pleased with the speed and informality of
the process. Those who did not settle and went to trial generally thought the directions
hearing was a useful step even if it had not been for them. Some who were convinced that
a trial was the only way for them to be vindicated thought the additional step was a waste

of time. Lawyers' opinions about the new directions hearing also were divided. However
apart from this lawyers are in favour of the small claims process. It offers a judicially
determined result with a resulting court enforceable judgment at very low cost compared to
general claims. Lawyers say that it is not economic to represent parties in claims under
$10,000. Some conclude that the small claims lunit should be increased to that sum.
Others think the results are on occasions too unreliable to increase the limit that far. None
think the present limit of $5,000 is too high. A new procedure allowing claims over
$5,000 to remain as small claims unless someone objects may be a sensible compromise.

The small claims procedure is a very cost effective way of providing access to the courts.
There is a trade off here. Without lawyers the quality of the result is highly dependant on
the ability of and the time a magistrate has to devote to each case because of the very high
demand placed on the magistrate to ensure that the factual and legal issues are properly
canvassed.

The introduction of a directions hearing before trial with the option of

mediation being offered has been well received by those parties who settled at the
directions hearing or at mediation but with some additional personal cost to litigants who
went to trial. It has the advantage of giving the magistrate an unambiguous role at the trial
as an adjudicator, compared to the system without a directions hearing where a magistrate
who failed as a conciliator then adjudicated.

The conyentional trial path
The fixed rate cost scale, which provides a predictable and limited party/party cost
recovery has been all pervasive in maintaining a cost savmg culture in the Magistrates
Court. It does not reward activity but the completion of the key steps m the process.
Rules that permit limited pretrial activity assist this culture but it is the lack of cost
incentives for non essential work that discourages it. This has clearly limited the cost to
parties of litigating in the Magistrates Court. Cost penalties that modify the party/party
costs have discouraged excessive ambit claims and have encouraged offers that have helped
to settle cases earlier. This also has saved costs.

Conclusions
The common feature of these findings is that involving the parties in the dispute resolution
process at points at which they are given opportunities to settle has been effective in

allowing a significant number to settle earlier than they were previously.

This and

ensuring clear and timely information is given to parties must be part of policies designed
to reduce and limit costs to litigants.. Courts' pretrial processes must not be primarily
designed for the small percentage of cases that are finalised by judicial determination but
rather must assist the great majority of parties who will settle to do so earlier in the
process. Parties must be given multiple exit points firom the litigation path. Expensive
legal procedures should be left as late in the process as possible to minimise the cost
burden on the cases that settle. All procedures should be assessed in the light of the costs
they cause the parties. For example allowing proof of damage by service of an invoice
with the claim is a small change that has brought significant savings to the parties, mostly
in motor vehicle property damage clauns.

In addition courts can substantially reduce the parties' costs by adopting special procedures
for particular classes of cases such as the preaction notice in personal injury claims and the
small claims procedure where lawyers are excluded where their costs would be
disproportionate to the amount of the dispute.

Finally it is essential that the cost scale gives certain and predictable party/party costs
which is not increased by activity. This allows the parties to make rational choices and
gives them a basis on which to negotiate costs with their own lawyers. It discourages
profligate legal jousts over issues that at the end of the few cases that go to judicial
determination do not matter anyway.

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION
The Magistrates Court in South Australia in 1992 was given control of its own
procedures and, as one of its policy objectives, was concerned to limit and reduce the
costs to the parties of conducting litigation in that court. The court adopted caseflow
management policies and procedures with cost factors specifically in mind. A lump
sum/percentage cost scale was adopted to provide predictable and certain costs accruing
on the stage of the process and so not encouraging activity for activity's sake. A set of
cost penalties was put in place to encourage realistic offers. Since those initial policies
the court, in conjunction with other courts in South Australia, also has adopted a special
procedure in personal injury matters to require pre-action notice, which enables the
insurers of the defendant to attempt to settle the matter before the costs of filing the
claim and defending it are incurred. Most recently the court has offered court-annexed
mediation and has been proactive in ensuring that litigants are personally aware of the
litigation process, the alternatives offered by the court and the cost issues m litigation.
The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which those policies have been
effective in limiting and reducing the cost to parties of conducting litigation in the
Magistrates Court in South Australia. The cost of litigation cannot be viewed in isolation.
Just as an extremely ponderous but accurate and expensive dispute resolution process may
not be useful to society in solving its civil disputes due to the fact that it is not accessible to
a large part of society due to its expense, in contrast, a cheap dispute resolution process
which yields results that are unreliable or even capricious and leaves the parties with a
sense that they were not given a proper hearing would be only to replace one evil with
another. Policies to make the delivery of dispute resolution more affordable must still
ensure that other important elements of the system are not substantially prejudiced. The
Magistrates Rules identify three prime policy objectives, namely the expeditious,
economical and just conduct and resolution of an action or proceeding."^ The primary focus
of this research is whether the policies adopted have been effective in ensurmg the
economical conduct and resolution of actions and proceedmgs. It is the contention of the
^ Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA), r 3. After this footnote references are to
the rule alone.

author that in the context of the Australian legal system the Magistrates Court has and still
does deal with its matters in a reasonably expeditious way, and in the event this research
suggests that the policies introduced with an intention of reducing costs have not increased
delay; on the contrary, if anything, they have reduced it. It is important that the justice of
dispute resolution not be prejudiced significantly by any other policy parameters. It is
beyond the ambit of this research to carefully articulate and research the justice of the
dispute resolution in the Magistrates Court. Although it has not been specifically
researched, there is no suggestion that the level of appeals has substantially increased as a
result of the policies researched in this thesis. Thus by the judicial system standards, the
level of justice has not been significantly called into question. Whatever justice may in
fact be, the litigants' view of whether they received it is one measure of it. It is not the job
of courts to be populists, but it is important that the litigants in the court processes have a
sense that they were given procedural fairness, even if they are not happy with the
outcome.
In this research firstly I have discussed some of the approaches to cost concerns and
policies adopted in other common law countries in particular, and I have briefly looked at
the German costs system because it has attracted some favourable comment in the Woolf
Report^. Some dangers of having too efficient a litigation system with certain and effective
cost and judgment recovery are also discussed. It is intended that this discussion gives
context to the policies to be discussed and sets out some of the pitfalls of pursuing cost
reduction.
Although the various policies in the Magistrates Court intended to address the cost issue
have been introduced at different times, it is convenient to discuss and assess those policies
in the order of their stage within the litigation process rather than arbitrarily by when they
have been adopted.
It has been the mtention of this ongoing process of reform that the pretrial processes of the
court should not be solely nor even primarily designed to bring cases in an orderly manner
to a judicial determination. They are intended rather to encourage and give opportunities
^ Lord Woolf Access to Justice - Final Report Internet
HTTP:\\ltc.law.warwick.ac.uk\woolf\report July 1996

to settle, or exit points, to litigants at as many stages of the process as possible. Those
who cannot settle but wish to take the case to the end are able so to do. This may establish
a point of principle for them and also may create a useful precedent for future litigants and
society at large. However they are the minority and the pretrial procedures accommodate
them but are not designed around them.

The court needs to adequately serve many different users. It has regular commercial users
collecting the occasional debts from a multitude of transactions that they undertake,
typically retail stores and financial institutions.

There are the one-off litigants greatly

incensed by a matter and willing to devote all their material resources to successfiilly
establish a matter of principle. There are wealthy litigants some of whom may be willing
to exploit procedural opportunities to exhaust their less well-resourced opponents. Society
itself has its needs from the litigation process to ensure that results are within society's
parameters and to set precedents for other disputants. A proper balance needs to be found
between facilitating the resolution of disputes and exacerbating disputes by offering too
easy and affordable a facility for those who are argumentative and greedy. Rights too easy
to enforce can be exploited as weapons of abuse. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that all
these aspects of a just civil litigation system can be satisfied in a cost-effective way. It is
certain that not all the litigants can be left happy. "The convoluted wording of legalisms
grew up around the necessity to hide from ourselves the violence that we intend toward
each other.

It is only because of the vicissitudes of human nature that we need a civil

litigation system at all. It is, however, obvious that for a well-ordered society we do need
a civil litigation system, and it is submitted that the aspirations set out in the Magistrates
Court Rules quoted above, that it provide an expeditious, economical and just conduct of
dispute resolution, are realistic and appropriate aspirations. Whilst the purpose of this
research is primarily to assess whether certain policies that have been adopted have been
effective m reducmg the costs to the parties of conducting their litigation in the Magistrates
Court, the research has also attempted to monitor any consequences the policies may have
had in relation to delay and litigant perception of the fakness of the process. It is noted
that costs to the litigant is primarily discussed in terms of costs they have expended on
lawyers, experts and other disbursements rather than their own time and internal costs of
their organisations. However, some assessment of their own costs has been borne in mind

^ Frank Herbert, Dune Messiah (P' ed, NEL paperback, London, 1972) p 160.

in the evaluation.
It is appropriate to first turn to the recent history of the court and describe the mtroduction
of the policies the subject of this research and, within that, to briefly outline the means
adopted to evaluate those policies.
A Brief History of the Court and its Jurisdiction
Historically, the Magistrates Court in South Australia was divided mto courts with
jurisdiction over limited geographical areas known as 'Local Courts'. These had a limited
civil jurisdiction. Above that, all civil disputes were conducted in the Supreme Court. In
1970, an amendment created an intermediate court in South Australia, known as the
District Court, which had jurisdiction over civil matters between the jurisdiction of the
Magistrates Court and the Supreme Court. The civil jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court
was conferred by this legislation and was still dealt with on a regional basis by the various
'Local' Magistrates Courts. In 1975, the Magistrates Court had conferred upon it a small
claims jurisdiction up to a limit of $500. At that tune its 'lunited' jurisdiction was $2,500.
Magistrates could hear cases up to that limit. District Court judges could hear claims up
to $7,500. The small claims jurisdiction was a plenary jurisdiction, i.e. all monetary
claims under $500 were dealt with as a small claim and subject to special procedures. In
1982 the Small Clauns Jurisdiction was increased to $1,000 and the Limited Jurisdiction to
$7,500. District Court judges could hear claims to $46,000 and $60,000 for damages for
personal injury caused in motor vehicle accidents.
In May 1988, the small claims jurisdiction was increased to $2,000 and the limited
jurisdiction to $20,000. The Magistrates Court in its civil jurisdiction, then still known as
the 'Local Court', remained as an adjunct to the District Court. District Court judges
could hear claims to $100,000 and $150,000 for motor vehicle personal mjury clauns.
In 1992 the jurisdiction of the courts was substantially altered. The Magistrates Court was
constituted under a separate Act of Parliament, given Rule-making powers, and its civil
jurisdiction was increased to $60,000 for personal injury claims arising from motor vehicle
accidents and also for actions for recovery of property and $30,000 in other matters.^
^ Magistrates Court Act 1992 (SA), s 8.

In 1987, general damages in personal injury claims arising from motor vehicle accidents
were capped at $60,000, indexed for inflation for accidents in subsequent years.® Courts
assessing those damages need to prescribe a number between one and 60 to the injury.
This is then multiplied by $1,000.^ The Supreme Court interpreted this to the effect that
60 was reserved for the most serious of injuries, and a typical whiplash injury would be of
the order of five to eight.

Before this, awards for past and fuUire pain and suffering (the

equivalent to the Wrongs Act number) for a typical whiplash injury were much higher.
For example in Wilkinson v. Alseika^^ the award for past and future pain and suffermg for
a "disabling though not a crippling injury of a whiplash type exacerbated by the nerve
lesion" ^^ was $30,000. Allowing for inflation, this was of the order of eight times the
typical award in 1987 under the Wrongs Act. The combination of the reduction of general
damages consequent upon the amendment to the Wrongs Act in conjunction with the
increase in jurisdiction, resulted m the transfer of a substantial portion of personal injury
motor vehicle accident claims from the District Court to the Magistrates' Court.

South Australia has its population highly concentrated in the main capital city of Adelaide.
In suburban and country areas. Magistrates Courts deal with both civil and criminal
jurisdictions. However, in the CBD and inner metropolitan area, the civil and criminal
jurisdictions, for many decades, have been separated. A specialist civil Magistrates Court
serves the CBD and inner metropolitan area.

This court has been staffed by five

magistrates for the past 20 years. The author has been supervising that court formally
since 1 August 1991 and prior to that, on an acting basis with some minor interruptions,
since 8 April 1988. As an author of some of these policies I would like to find that they
are effective. I have borne this self interest in mind when undertaking this research.

® Wrongs Act 1936 (SA), s 35A.
^ 1987 - the multiplier increases with inflation.
See Packer v. Cameron, (1989) 54 S.A.S.R. 246
^^ SA Supreme Court (1981) 97 LSJS 355
Ibid p 358
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PoUcies Adopted in the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992
The 1992 Magistrates Court Act delivered the power to control its own procedures to the
Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court stated its motherhood principle in its civil
jurisdiction as "the Court and Registrar must in all things promote the expeditious,
economical and just conduct and resolution of an action or proceeding" (author's italics)
and "these Rules are not intended to defeat the proper action brought in good faith of any
party and are to be interpreted accordingly". The court has regard to the Supreme Court
case-flow management Rules. ^^
In the Magistrates Court, delay historically has not been and still is not a significant
problem. The Adelaide Civil Registry of the court in the past five years has not had a trial
delay for litigants ready for trial of more than nine months.Other Registries in South
Australia have less delay. Statistics on the percentage of cases completed within a
particular time have only been taken out occasionally. Those figures again show a
satisfactory, albeit slowly deteriorating position. ^^ The mcreased number of early
settlements occurring at the directions hearing reported later should have significantly
improved this position.
The Magistrates rules committee identified the cost of litigation as a major impediment to
access to justice. In adopting procedures, the cost implications for the parties were borne
in mind. Several innovations have been adopted to reduce costs. These are discussed in
their order in the litigation process not their order of adoption.

The Ninety Day Preaction Notice Rule
In South Australia, all third party personal injury motor vehicle msurance is held by SGIC.
In 1991, SGIC had initiated informal conferences to deal with the backlog of pre-1990
personal injury actions in the District Court. This led SGIC to establish m August 1992 a
settlement conference team of experienced claims officers to endeavour to settle claims
before legal proceedings were issued. This team has resolved, on average, 100 claims per
^^ Rules.
^^ See appendix A.
^^ See appendix B.

month, with a settlement rate of 85-95%.^^ As evidence of the success of this approach,
the average time to settle CTP claims has reduced from 31 months in 1991 to 25 months in
1993.^^ In 1993 the Crown Solicitor made representations to the Chief Justice on behalf of
SGIC. As a result, at the end of 1993, all civil courts in South Australia introduced Rule
amendments to provide that a plaintiff in an action for damages for personal injuries who
failed to give at least 90 days notice of the claim to the defendant's insurer or the
defendant, is not entitled to the costs of preparing and filing the claim. In the Magistrates
Court this rule effects all actions commenced after 7 March 1994.^^
Most defendants of personal injury actions are insured against the liability. The purpose
of the Rule is to give the insurer an opportunity to settle the claun before the substantial
additional costs of initiating a court action are incurred by the plaintiff and, ultimately,
paid for by the defendant if the claim is successfiil. SGIC is the insurer of the
overwhelming majority of defendants in personal injury claims in South Australian courts.
The number of these claims has declined substantially. An analysis of data made available
by SGIC has been conducted to assess to what extent the decline in personal injury matters
commenced in the Magistrates Court can be attributed to the introduction of this Rule
rather than other factors such as a change in policy by SGIC, a decline in the number of
accidents, less incentive to claim due to reduction in level of general damages, or other
factors. Interviews of legal practitioners who specialise in personal injury claims, both
from plaintiffs' and defendants' perspectives, have been conducted to ascertain their view
of the cause of the reduction in personal injury claims and the effectiveness of the new
procedure.

^^ John Winter "The ninety day rule" (24 February 1994), an unpublished paper delivered
to lawyers as part of the Law Society of SA CLE program.
Ibid, p 3.
Rule 106(8). The lawyer may still be able to charge the client- eg if instructions were
given at the end of the limitation period and it was necessary to file without notice to avoid
5ie claim being statute barred. In the higher courts the penalty is all costs.
^^ After 28/10/93 in the Supreme and District Courts.

Information to litigants and Mediation
In a pilot initiative commenced on 1 May 1996, the Adelaide civil registry of the
Magistrates Court adopted new procedures to ensure that parties to litigation had timely
and accurate information about the cost and nature of the litigation process and offered a
mediation service as an alternative dispute resolution technique. Parties in defended
actions were required to attend in person at the first directions hearing. These directions
hearings were conducted by a magistrate who explains to the litigants the court's
party/party cost scale and the potential difference between that and solicitor/client costs.
The magistrate offered alternative paths in the conduct of the litigation. The first of these
remains the conventional path through normal preparation processes to a conciliation
conference and, if settlement does not occur there, to a trial. The alternative path offered
is direct to a mediation conference conducted by a court officer at no charge to the parties
or, if they wish, a mediator retained by them either under a pro bono scheme offered by
the Law Society or a paid mediator. If the case settles at mediation the court can contmue
to supervise it until the terms of settlement are carried out and, when they are, dismisses
the case or records a judgment if that is the agreement. If the case does not settle it is
referred direct to a magistrate to ensure the necessary pretrial steps are conducted to bring
it to trial without going back to a conciliation conference, unless the parties wish that. It is
the intention that mediation be an alternative path and not an additional step in the
conventional path.
The mediation offered by the court is at no charge to the parties and is conducted by senior
registry staff trained in LEADR^ mediation. The parties are also given information about
the availability of private mediators. The mediator's role in this process is to help the
disputmg parties find a solution to the dispute with which they both agree. This can be
distinguished from the adjudication or trial process in several respects, in particular:
•
The parties control the result;
•
Relationships between the parties may be preserved;
•
Problems in proving a claim may be overcome;
•
Everything is discussed in confidence in comparison to a public trial;
•
Creative solutions beyond traditional legal options may be available;
^ Lawyers Engaged in Alternative Dispute Resolution, an organisation that trains and
accredits mediators.

•

The resolution of the dispute does not necessarily involve winners and losers.^^

It is explained to the parties that they should not enter the mediation without being aware
of the potential results they may achieve by the trial process so that, before agreeing to a
mediated result, they can make a sensible assessment of whether it is in their best
interests.^^ The parties are given information pamphlets to explain to them these alternative
paths and the legal cost issues.^ The court's party/party cost scale is a lump
sum/percentage scale so that these costs are predictable. If the parties choose mediation by
the court as the path, then a time is appointed some three weeks ahead for the mediation
hearing.
One of the objectives of this hearing is to give parties an opportunity to finalise their cases
earlier in the process than they previously could under the conventional litigation track.
Over 90% of cases are finalised without a judicial determination at trial,usually at the
conciliation conference or on the court steps on a trial day. By either occasion substantial
legal fees have been incurred. This is an opportunity for some of those parties to settle
earlier, with one benefit being a reduction in the costs they have incurred by the time of
that settlement.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the effect of offering timely information to the parties
and the alternative of mediation has been conducted. The number and percentage of cases
where the parties adopted mediation, and the outcome, has been recorded. A comparison
^^ These are a summary of LEADR objectives for mediation.
^^ In LEADR terms the parties should have an idea of the 5est, Worst or Most Likely
y41ternative to a A/egotiated i4greement- known as the BATNA, WATNA or MLATNA.
^^ These are reproduced in Appendix G.
^ In a sample of three months defended general claims in the Adelaide Civil Registry of
the Magistrates Court in SA inl992 tracked to conclusion only 27 out of the total sample
of 379 had a trial commenced. This sample is discussed in Chapter 5. Consistent with
this finding Williams Goldsmith and Browne The cost of civil litigation before
intermediate courts in Australia, AIJA 1992 p 45 found that of cases issued in the
samples in VIC and QLD !0% go to trial. Professor Judith Resnick University of
Southern California, "Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication; A glimpse at
changes in the United States" an unpublished paper delivered to the Litigation Reform
Commission conference Brisbane 1996, p. 4 reported that research in America showed less
than 4% of civil cases go to verdict. The balance do not all settle- some are summarily
determined or arefinaUsedby default.

has been made of a three month san^le of cases conducted under the pilot scheme to a
previous three month sample of cases before the scheme came into effect, to ascertain if a
higher percentage of cases settled earlier. Lawyers have been interviewed to find their
perception of the effectiveness of the new process and parties have been interviewed to
gauge the extent of their understanding of the alternatives and the reasons for their
choosing mediation or the conventional path. They have also been asked their opinion of
the processes they experienced. The results are discussed in Chapter 5.
Alternative Adjudication - The Small Claims Procedure
The Magistrates Court has had a special procedure for small claims since 1975. Since
1992 the general jurisdictional limit for small claims has been $5,000 and has included a
general equitable jurisdiction^. Small claims are a type of minor civil action. In late 1995
a new class of minor civil actions known as minor statutory proceedings was created. This
includes disputes about fences, domestic building contracts, second-hand motor vehicle
warranties and retail shop leases. In these if they are under $5,000 they must be conducted
in the minor civil action jurisdiction, but if they are over $5,000 either party may elect to
have them removed to the general jurisdiction. For the purpose of this thesis these
distinctions are unimportant and all are described as small claims because that term is
generally used in Australia to describe claims with similar special procedures.
Small claims are commenced with thefilingof a claim form as with general claims but no
interlocutory processes are allowed without leave which is rarely given.^ The most
general pleadings are accepted and discovery and other pretrial activity is not required.
The small claims trial process is an adjudication procedure with the court deciding the
factual basis for its determination and then making a determination in accordance with
legal principles. However, the procedure is clearly distinct from the general adversary
legal process. The court is required to investigate possibilities of arriving at a negotiated
settlement and "the trial will take the form of an mquiry by the court into the matters in
dispute between the parties rather than an adversarial contest between the parties".^ The
Magistrates Court Aa 1991 (SA), s 8.
^ Rule 65.
^ Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 38.
25

court may itself call witnesses, is not bound by the rules of evidence, must act according to
equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to
technicalities and legal forms and the parties are not bound by written pleadings.^^ This is
clearly

an

alternative

to

the

conventional

adversary

process,

where

the

magistrate/adjudicator remains aloof from the field of battle only to adjudicate at the end.
In small claims, the magistrate is a major participant in the trial process, often being
examiner-in-chief, cross-examiner and adjudicator. What is common with the normal trial
process it that the trial occurs in open court and the magistrate adjudicates between the
parties and imposes a decision upon them. The parties are not in control of this process, in
contrast to mediation where if the parties achieve a result it is their choice and the process
is undertaken in private and confidentially.

Until 1996, the practice in small claims was to list them for trial without any pretrial
process. The trial was typically 8 to 12 weeks after the defence was filed. Only about a
third of these small claims actually proceeded to judgment^^ and, in respect of those which
did, the parties were often ill-prepared or did not know the court's expectations in relation
to the evidence that they should bring to the hearing. Some litigants resented attempts by
magistrates to bring the parties to a settlement. To address these concerns, on 1 May
1996, a pretrial step was introduced on a pilot basis in the Adelaide Civil Registry. The
parties were required to attend a directions hearing conducted by a member of registry
staff, trained in LEADR mediation. At that hearing they were encouraged to negotiate a
settlement. If they did not settle the difference between mediation and the trial process was
explained to the parties and they were offered the choice of either process.

A duty

magistrate was available to deal with default matters and to assist with procedural and
other advice. If the parties chose mediation, a mediation date was appointed before a
court-trained mediator. If they chose the trial process, the evidence they needed to bring
to the trial was discussed with them. Written information about each of those alternatives
was given to the litigants.^®

Ibid.
^^ In a sample of three months defended small claims in the Adelaide civil registry of the
Magistrates Court in SA in 1992 tracked to conclusion 167 out of the total sample of 537
(31 %) had a trial conmienced. This sample is discussed in Chapter 6.
The mformation pamphlets are reproduced in Appendix G.

The small claims procedure saves the parties substantial legal costs. The fact that pretrial
processes such as discovery between the parties are generally not allowed and the
exclusion of lawyers from participating in the trial avoids the substantial legal costs that are
incurred in these processes in general claims. A successfiil claimant is only entitled to
recover legal fees from the loser incurred for the preparation of the claun in the sum of
$20 plus 10% of the claim up to a maximum of $200 and the court filing fee of $48.
Nominal witness fees are allowed to the party successful at trial^^
To evaluate the small claims procedure a previous client survey has been reviewed, there is
a quantitative comparison of the point of disposal and delay in 3 month samples of
defended cases in 1992 and 1996, answers to interviews of parties who have been through
the new procedure have been analysed and lawyers have been interviewed. The new step
of a directions hearing and offering mediation is a close parallel to the pilot scheme in the
general claims jurisdiction. The level of understanding by the parties of their choices and
their reasons for choosing trial or mediation can be extrapolated to the parallel general
claims procedure. The extra step introduced into the process must cost parties who go to
trial more of their own tune and the extent that this is balanced by other advantages is
evaluated.

The conyentional path - fixed rate cost scales, cost penalties and case flow
management policies that allow pretrial activity to be minimised
The rules have three strategies to limit costs in cases that proceed down the conventional
track. Firstly, there is a fixed rate cost scale.^^ This provides two scales for general
claims, one for routine matters and one for complex matters.^^ A party can convert a
matter for cost purposes to the complex scale by givmg written notice to the other. If the
other does not contest that conversion within 21 days, the party/party costs will be on the
complex scale. If it is contested, the issue of the appropriate scale is determined by the
trial magistrate.^"^ If parties wish an earlier determination, they can apply to the court for
^^ The cost scale is reproduced in Appendix H.
^^ In Appendix H the cost scales and relevant cost rules are set out.
^^ The third scale is for minor civil actions (small claims).
Rule 106 (7).

that issue to be determined. The routine and complex scales have the same items, but
there is a small cost increase in complex matters for taking original instructions, in some
items in the pretrial process and, in preparing a case for trial. The scales provide a mixture
of percentage and lump sum costs to the net effect that, at the end of the first day of trial in
a matter that has not had many adjournments of pretrial steps, in a routine action the
party/party costs will be 30% of the amount of judgment to a plaintiff or, if the defendant
wms, the amount claimed against the defendant. In a complex action the costs will be
36%. Disbursements will add another 4% and a great deal more if professional reports
and witnesses are used.

A daily rate for counsel applies after the first day with no

additional solicitor fees or refreshers for counsel.
costs may be significantly below the actual costs.

It is recognised that these party/party
This gap is used by cost penalty

provisions to encourage the parties to make realistic offers by not later than the conciliation
conference. The rules have the usual cost penalties to the effect that if a plamtiff obtains a
higher judgment than an offer filed by the plaintiff then from 14 days after the offer was
made the plaintiff receives solicitor client costs. If the plaintiff obtains a judgment for less
than the defendant's filed offer then the plamtiff pays the defendants party/party costs.^^ In
addition rules 52 and 53 provide a formula to the effect that if a plaintiff obtains a
judgment for less than half the amount claimed at the conciliation conference then the
plaintiff's cost entitlement is reduced but if the plaintiff obtains a judgment for more than
twice the defendant's filed offer at the conciliation conference then the plaintiff's cost
entitlement is increased. Once either rule applies the greater the margin the greater the
effect the formula has on the cost entitlement. The rules are intended to encourage the
parties and their advisers to make realistic assessments of their prospects of success by the
conciliation conference so that the plaintiff reduces his or her claim to a realistic figure and
the defendant makes a realistic offer. It is also intended to discourage the spurious
counterclaim which has no merit except to frighten the plaintiff. ^^

^^ A typical bill is included in Appendix I.
^^ Rule 59 which is reproduced in Appendix H.
^^ Rules 52 and 53 are reproduced in appendix H. Examples of the operation of the rules
are• a plaintiff amends the claun to $40,000 at the conciliation conference but only obtains
judgment for $10,000: rule 52 reduces the Cost Entitlement by 2 x costs x 10,000
-r40,000 = 1/2 ie the plaintiffs party/party costs are halved.
• a defendant files an offer of $5000 at the conciliation conference but the plaintiff obtains
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The case-flow management procedure of the court is to call the parties in for a directions
hearing about four weeks after a defence is filed. Parties who choose the conventional
path advise when they will be ready for a conciliation conference dates are fixed to attend
to any interlocutory matters. If the case does not settle at the conciliation conference it is
set for trial. In an endeavour to save costs to the parties, it is not a policy of the rules that
the parties must be ready for trial at the conciliation conference. Although in personal
injury matters it is necessary for the litigants to automatically make discovery under the
rules and also for the plaintiff to provide extensive particulars,^^ in all other claims there is
no automatic requirement for any pretrial activity. Interrogatories are only permitted with
leave of the court.^^ It is not necessary to file copies of any documents other than the
pleadings at the court except expert reports and the personal injury particulars for the
conciliation conference. Because the court does not monitor whether these steps have
occurred, there is no need for it to receive copies of the documents. The policy of these
rules is to allow litigants and their advisers to minimise pretrial activity rather than
automatically impose it on each file, regardless of its ultimate outcome. The court accepts
that some actions are notftillyprepared for trial by the conciliation conference. However,
given that only 1%^ go to trial, it is better to have some of those under-prepared than to
impose very expensive over-preparation designed for the trial process on the 93% of cases
that never go to trial. The rules adopt policies that are specifically directed at minimismg
costs to the litigants, to ensure that adequate offers are made and to ensure that the
party/party costs are predictable.
Prior to the requirement introduced on 1 May 1996 that the parties attend in person at the
first directions hearing it is reasonable to infer that the parties were largely unaware of
these policies. Any affect of these policies on the conduct of litigation lay with the parties'
legal advisers. Interviews of the legal profession have been conducted to ascertain their
knowledge of these policies and the extent to which they have influenced them to modify
a judgment for $20,000: rule 53 raises the Cost Entitlement by 2 x costs x (20,0005000) ^20,000 =3/2 ie the plaintiff's party/party costs are increased by 50%. There is
a cap on this increase of actual solicitor client costs.
Rule 68.
^^ Rule 74.

their activity in a way that reduces costs to the litigants. Smce 1 May 1996 the parties
attend in person at the first directions hearing where they are given oral and written
information about the concepts in the cost rules and their choices/^ Parties have been
interviewed to ascertain their level of understanding of these issues.

In accordance with the 1992 sample discussed in footnote 24.
^^ The information pamphlets are reproduced in Appendix G.

CHAPTERS
SOME POLICY ISSUES IN REDUCING THE COST OF LITIGATION
United States of American experience
Kakalik and Pace in Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort UtigationJ^^ conducted a wideranging analysis of the relationship between the costs of conducting court litigation and
compensation pay-outs in the United States. This surveyed total expenditure on tort
litigation in both State and Federal Courts in the United States of America in 1985. They
estimated that approximately 866,000 tort lawsuits were terminated annually in State and
Federal Courts of general jurisdiction in 1985."^^ The total cost of expendimre on this tort
litigation in that year was between $US29 billion and $US36 billion, of which an estimated
$US16 billion to $US19 billion was spent on the various costs of the tort litigation system,
that is, less than half the total expenditure was spent on the net condensation paid to the
plaintiffs.^ Therefore, plaintiffs received about $US14 billion to $US16 billion out of the
total pay-out of $US29 billion to $US36 billion. After deducting the defendants' legal
fees, the plaintiffs' legal fees and expenses represented approximately 30-31% of total
compensation paid to plaintiffs.There was no substantial difference between the legal
fees and expenses paid by plaintiffs in auto-tort cases compared to other tort cases (31%
and 30% respectively). However, the defendants' costs of litigation between these classes
of cases differed significantly. In auto-tort cases, defence legal fees and expenses were an
estimated 16% of total compensation in auto cases, whereas in non-auto cases, which are
often more complex, defence legal fees and expenses were 28% of total conq)ensation
paid. Plaintiffs' costs in America are usually paid on a contingent fee basis. Depending
on the court and type of tort case, only 2%-6% of individual plaintiffs pay their lawyers on
an hourly basis, and only l%-2% pay on some other basis, such as a flat fee.'*^ The
percentage fee varies but is of the order of one-third. Where proof of liability may be
difficult (e.g. asbestos cases), the percentage may be higher, but where liability is obvious
1986 RAND, the Instimte for Civil Justice.
^^ Ibid p vi.
^ Ibidpvii.
Ibidpviii
^ Ibid p 37.

(e.g. airline accident cases), the percentage may be lower."^^ In contrast in South Australia
the SGIC data discussed below shows in 1991/2, the year in which costs as a percentage of
payout were highest, that plamtiffs' medico-legal costs as a percentage of the total payout
to the plaintiffs was Yh.lJo^ and if the unrepresented claimants are takenfromthe data the
percentage is 14.
It is, of course, too facile to suggest that the reduction of costs alone will necessarily result
in greater justice. Franaszek in Justice and the Reduction of Litigation Cost; A Different
Perspective,^ confronts the assumption that if the goals of reduced cost or delay have
been achieved, the goal of improved access to justice has also been achieved. He points
out that a small reduction in cost may merely allow greater use of the court system by
those who already had access to it, rather than enabling persons presently precluded by the
costs from accessing the system. (The European experience discussed below supports this
prediction.) To analyse this in an intellectually pure way, it is necessary to define "justice"
first and, having done so, to then analyse the effects of reduction of cost on justice as
defined. He goes so far on one proposed definition of "justice", namely a "utilitarian
definition of justice" to suggest that settlement itself may not advance utility. He quotes
Fiss "Against settlement",^^ "To be against settlement is only to suggest that when parties
settle society gets less than what appears and for a price it does not know it is paying.
Parties might settle while leaving justice undone."
Franaszek's article is useful to confront the bold assertion that what we are presently doing
in courts is delivering justice, and therefore if we do it cheaper we are, per se, improving
access to justice. I deal with this in at least two ways. The legal cost to parties of taking a
case to trial in the Magistrates' Court on the party/party scale is a minimum of 30% each.
"" Ibid p 38.
See Appendix C.
Ibid.
^ (1985) 37 Rutgers Law Review.
^^ (1984) 93 Yale U 1073 at 1085.

ie. 60% between them.^^ Add disbursements and the total amount paid out on a trial may
well exceed the amount in dispute and actual costs will often exceed these party/party
costs. The parties' own time and costs are additional again. It is excessive to put parties
to a greater expense than the amount of their argument in every case to ensure that a
utilitarian notion of justice is imposed on every one. It is better to offer them opportunities
and assistance in arriving at settlements they can live with and are not unfairly forced into.
The earlier settlements occur the more costs are saved. Procedures that discourage
unnecessary legal activity before settlements occur result in a ftirther saving to those
parties. Likewise, in relation to matters that go to trial, if procedures reduce costs and do
not reduce the integrity of the trial process, then that also is an improvement. Simply, all
other things being equal, if the cost of achieving the same result is reduced, then per se
that is an improvement. Cheap may not be beautiful, but less exorbitant is better. More
fiindamentally, it would be arrogant and absurd to suggest that the value of the decisions
by magistrates in civil matters in this State is so great that they have general utility to
society, regardless of the expense of arriving at them. This cannot be the case because
very few are reported so only the parties know the result and the reasons for it. Moreover
on occasions our decisions are wrong. We do our best, but even where factual situations
give clear legal answers, on occasions we can be wrong. The fact situation may be
impossible to resolve with certainty. For example, I remember a case where a plaintiff
driver alleged that he did not fail to stand, but rather the vehicle coming from the opposite
direction deviated from its side of the road and turned, without apparent reason, into him
and collided with his stationary vehicle. I thought that sounded unlikely. I heard from the
driver and the passenger from the approaching vehicle, who both gave cogent evidence to
the effect that the plaintiff hesitated, failed to stand, turned across their path and then
stopped right in front of their vehicle. At that point, on the balance of probabilities, the
most likely version was that of the defendant and her witness, namely that the plamtiff
made an error of judgment and turned across their path, saw the approaching vehicle,
hesitated and then stopped in front of it. A barmaid at the hotel which was on the corner,
sought refuge from her duties and on the balcony overlooking the intersection, was
enjoying a cigarette. She was a stranger to all parties and saw the defendant vehicle come
down the road, the driver and the passenger horsing about m the front of it and, quite
remarkably, it veered to the wrong side of the road and drove straight into a stationary
^^ See the discussion under the heading The conventional path m Chapter 2.

vehicle, namely that of the plaintiff. This event was so remarkable, she thought the
plaintiff may be unfairly dealt with and went downstairs and gave her name and address to
the plaintiff. On that evidence, clearly the defendant bore all the liability. If, however,
the barmaid was a conspirator with the plaintiff, who perjured herself to give false
evidence to explain away the accident, then of course the defendant and her passenger
were right. To suggest that the resolution of a dispute of this nature, even with the ftill
analysis of the adversary system and all our forensic skills, always can be determined
correctly, is nonsense. These are the easy ones. There are many cases which involve
balancing of rights, obligations, egos and power relationships in such a way that there can
be no black and white assertion as to the correct result. What the courts in civil
jurisdictions need to do is provide a credible procedure to resolve these disputes without
deluding themselves that the resolution they are providing is in some way justice of a Godlike nature. A good file is afilethat has been closed in a way that is credible to the parties
and in a way that will not see it reopened on appeal or by other means. The extreme
notion that society is in some way deprived by not having a judicial pronouncement on a
dispute, is just that, an extreme point of view.
Other American literature echoes the Franaszek concerns but in the context of evaluating
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) used by courts. Lind and others in The Perception
of Justice. Tort litigants' views of trial, court- annexed arbitration, and judicial settlement
conferences,^^ say
"These critics argue that litigation and litigation procedures should serve not only
the individual parties to the suit but also the society at large. The state provides
various dispute resolution methods for disputants, and society has an interest in
maintaining a structure for dispute resolution that comports well with the political
and social values of the society. Procedures express our value strucmre. Thus
society has concerns about dispute resolution that can be distinct from those of the
litigants. In addition, the accumulation of individual decisions in trials and appeals
provides a body of law to guide the actions of people m circumstances similar to
those involved in the suit. Moreover, society may have an interest in avoiding
particular outcomes of disputes, such as agreements that might benefit the plaintiff
^^ (Rand Corp., 1989) p 5.

and defendant but that would harm the community as a whole. Once society's
institution for resolving disputes has been engaged, it is argued, society's interests
must always be considered in responding to the resolution of- and presumably in
choosing the process of resolving- the dispute."
This is the same extreme view as Fiss (it is not necessarily Lind and others' view). Civil
disputes are hard enough to resolve credibly without a societal imperative intruding into
them. Some solutions should be precluded for reasons of illegality or public policy. These
however only lunit a few options and should not be allowed to drive disputes by always
requiring consideration of society's interests.
The same study concludes
"that case outcome, delay, and cost were less strongly related to perceived fairness
and satisfaction than is generally thought." and it follows that "these findings raise
doubts about whether cost or time saving innovations will increase individual tort
litigants' satisfaction and perceived fairness." Specifically "litigation cost, whether
absolute or relative to subjective standards, showed no substantial relationship to
perceived fairness or satisfaction among these tort litigants... contrary to commonly
held assumptions, we found that trial engendered higher levels of perceived control
and participation as well as higher levels of litigant comprehension... The data
suggests that tort litigants do not view trials as lessening their involvement in the
legal process, but rather as increasing their involvement."
The study suggests that perceptions of unbiased and dignified procedures, "perceived
carefulness of the process, evaluations of counsel, comfort with the procedure, and
perceived control over case events and outcomes" were more important for system and
outcome satisfaction than cost or delay.
"The study showed that whatever procedure is used, formal or informal, it must be
enacted well and seriously if is to be viewed as fair. The study suggests that
improvements in perceived justice and satisfaction are more likely to come from
changes in the tone of the judicial process than from innovations designed to cut
costs or reduce delay. Further, the study suggests that care must be taken to ensure
that innovations intended to reduce cost and delay do not do so at the expense of

those qualities of the judicial process that are more important to litigants. «54
One of the authors, Professor Judith Resnik from the university of southern California, in
a presentation at a Queensland Litigation Reform Commission conference in Brisbane
March 6- 8 1996 made the point that the judiciary has a unique function m the adjudication
and enforcement of civil claims. However if it fails to deliver on this process but rather
diverts all cases to ADR techniques (over which it does not have a monopoly) then the
very reason for the judiciary's existence and its claim on society's resources may cease to
exist. Further support for the adjudication process is given by Deborah Hensler m "Court
ordered arbitration: an alternative view".^^ In assessing court ordered arbitration she
reviews the above concerns that departures from the trial process remove the protections of
openness, formality, due process, a record of proceedings and the setting of normative
precedents.^^ Her review of research on arbitration shows a high degree of litigant
satisfaction in common with the trial process. She reports that "litigants believe that both
arbitration and trial are more fair than settlement conferences".^^ However m America
parties are often not present at settlement conferences. Litigants' high satisfaction with the
adjudication/ arbitration approach to finalising their disputes may reflect their personal
involvement in the process. Involvement and procedural fairness are important factors in
litigant satisfaction. In the small sample of litigants interviewed for this research the
perception of procedural fairness was more widely held amongst those who settled at
mediation than those who received a judicial determination at trial. No losers at trial were
satisfied with the process.^^ The parties were present at both. In Australia the trial
process as we presently conduct it is too expensive. We should be seeking ways of making
the trial process more affordable as well as seeking cheaper alternatives. These
alternatives must ensure procedural fairness.

^^ Ibidppvii-x.
^^ 1990 The Legal Forum 399, University of Chicago law school.
^^ Ibid p 405
Ibid p 417.
See chapter 5. These comments about trials were from small claims not general
claims.

Civil litigation in England and Wales

The Woolf interim report Access to Justic^^ is a comprehensive review of civil litigation
in England and Wales, with the aim of improving access to justice and reducing the cost of
litigation, reducing the complexity of rules and modernising terminology and removing
unnecessary distinctions of practice and procedure.
It is apparent from the review that England and Wales have not, as yet, adopted many of
the caseflow management and ADR reforms that have been or are being considered for
adoption in Australia. However this wide ranging and comprehensive report is useful in
bringing together current ideas in the common law world to reduce the cost of civil
litigation.
The report accepts the need for a fundamental shift in the responsibility of the management
of civil litigation from the litigants and their legal advisers to the courts. He identifies the
need to ensure that caseflow management techniques are adopted in such a way as to avoid
additional expense.^ His proposal is for a three tier system, namely:
• an increased small claims jurisdiction;
• a new fast track for cases at the lower end of the scale; and
• a new multi track covering both the High Court and County Court.^^
He highlights the problem of costs as a ratio to the value of the claim. Figures from cases
surveyed by the Supreme Court Taxmg Office showed that, in claims worth £12,500 or
less, the costs allowed were an average of £12,044, whereas for cases valued at £250,000,
the average costs were £58,434. The point is made that there is a high variation either side
of these average cost figures. These costs reflect the costs of only one side of the dispute
and I understand them to be party/party costs.^^ He recommends increased use of
^^ Lord Woolf Access to Justice (an mterim report to the Lord Chancellor on the civil
justice system in England and Wales, June 1995). The fmal report is now available and is
cited later.
^ Ibid p 32, para 22.
^^ Ibid p 34, para 4.
^^ Ibid p 35, para 7.

summary judgment to dispose of clear-cut cases at the earliest possible time.^^ What is
clear cut can be contentious. If this is to be successful it will require appeal courts to back
the summary judgment of the lower courts that the alleged claim or defence has no merit.
In respect of each of these tracks he recommends:
Small Claims
The need for information to litigants is usefiilly discussed under this heading.
Technological innovations, including "kiosks", can be used to provide information to
litigants through computer software programs. These could be sited in libraries, citizens'
advice bureaus and other places in addition to court premises. Information videos could be
similarly used. Back-up, written mformation in leaflet form should be available.
A concept of "unbundlmg" is discussed to the effect that litigants should be able to share
the work between themselves and their legal advisers rather than paying lawyers hourly
fees to do work that the litigant can successfully do themselves.
Fast Track
It is suggested these would include claims up to and including £10,000 and not including
matters mvolving complex issues of fact or law, issues of public interest or importance or a
significant degree of oral expert evidence or multiple parties. It is proposed that a trial
date be set at the outset, some 20 to 30 weeks from the outset, discovery will be lunited
and a trial be confined to not more than three hours, allocated equally between the parties
with a maximum of one day. There will be no oral evidence from experts. If necessary
the matter would be listed for directions before a District Court judge to make any
adjustment to these standard procedures. An integral part of the fast track will be that the
party/party costs will be known at the outset. Solicitor/client costs could only exceed these
party/party costs where there was an explicit agreement to pay more, which had been fiilly
explained to the litigant.^ He identifies three advantages in fixed costs, namely the
maximum liability or access to party/party costs is known at the outset, there is no need for
^^ Ibid p 37, para 17.
^ Ibid p 45, para 17.

taxation of costs and solicitors have to work to a budget.^^ It is interesting to note this
comment:
"An indication of what can be achieved in the way of swift and inexpensive civil
litigation is available from the German system where fixed percentage sums are
payable for costs m different categories of proceedings (see annex 5). This
approach does not appear to have had a deleterious effect on the income of German
lawyers. I am not suggesting that it is directly relevant to litigation in this
jurisdiction. I draw attention to thefiguresbecause they indicate that it is perfectly
possible to conduct litigation at a cost which is both certain and significantly lower
than that which prevails in this country. If we are serious about providing access to
justice then we must ensure that costs for the ordinary run of litigation which would
be conducted on the fast track are more in accord with those in Germany, where
access to justice is not considered prohibitively expensive.
Balance is needed here. Research by Professor Blankenburg, who has compared the Dutch
and German legal systems, strongly suggests that the effect of the relatively efficient and
cost certain system in Germany has been to enormously encourage litigation so that the
society has up to eight times as many civil claims as occur in the Netherlands, where the
civil system does not allow certain cost recovery and is relatively slow and inefficient.
Blankenburg strongly makes the point that use of the civil legal system cannot be equated
with access to justice. Indeed, his conclusion is that the German efficiency and certainty of
cost recovery is exploited by the powerful in society to the disadvantage of the less
powerful.^^ An efficient system must be combined with alternative dispute resolution,
early, and on an affordable basis to encourage litigants to escape the litigation process.
Otherwise the solution of cheap efficient access may cause the vice of an excessively
litigious society resorting to the courts to resolve disputes that were better dissolved by
private conciliation/mediation.

^^ Ibid p 45, para 18.
^ Ibid p 46, para 20.
^^ See A continental European experience next in this chapter.

Multi track
Cases outside the fast track are to be dealt with under a multi track. In essence, this is a
track providing for an initial scrutiny of the cases by a procedural judge shortly after the
defence has been received, to assess whether it should be dealt with under a standard
timetable or require individual attention and a further assessment of it and a review of the
case about 10 weeks prior to the trial to ensure that there is an effective preparation for
trial. In his final report he suggests a budget for costs in less complex or lower value cases
on the multi track and estimates and guidelines for costs will be fixed at the outset for other
cases on that track. It is also proposed that where the parties means are unequal cost
shifting to assist the weaker can be ordered.® If this is adopted it will require strict
judicial discipline to ensure that the application of these distinctions and fixing of budgets,
estimates and guidelines does not become an expensive preliminary diversion to the main
game.
AUemative dispute resolution (ADR)
The report identifies dispute resolution by courts, arbitration, administrative tribunals,
mini trials, ombudsman and mediation. In view of the extent of the reforms recommended
akeady in a system that is clearly, relatively unreformed, mtroducing ADR at this time is
regarded as too hard.® He does make the pomt that, an ethos of cooperation before
proceedings begin, would be helpful. In the final report he is more positive about ADR
suggesting that courts will encourage it by better information about it and the litigation
path being given to litigants and ADR being encouraged at case management conferences.
He recommends the adoption of protocols to ensure pre litigation disclosure in claims from
medical negligence, personal injury and housing disputes.We have tried a number of
these policies already and whether they really work is the subject of this research.
Other issues
The report identifies discovery as a cost abuse and a weapon used by well resourced
® hoid^oolf Access to Justice-final report (internet http://ltc.law.warwick.ac.uk/woolf/
report July 1996) overview pp 3 and 5.
®Ibidp 143, para 30.
Ibid and also chapters 5, 7 and 10.

parties to defeat the opponent. To address this it is recommended that documents be
rationalised into the following categories:
• the parties' own documents;
• adverse documents;
• relevant documents - these are document relevant to the proceedings, which do not
obviously support or undermine other side's case. They are part of the story or
background;
• train in inquiry documents (see Companie Financieri Du Pacific v. Peruvian Guano
Company (1882) 11 QBD 55, Brett U: "If it is a document which may fairly lead him
to a train of inquiry which may have either of these two consequences...").
He says categories one and two are standard discovery and categories three and four are
extra discovery. In the fast track, you only have to discover categories one or two; in the
multi track, the procedural judge will decide whether it goes beyond categories one or two
into category three and even into category four.
The likely result of this would be to cause more expensive arguments over these
distinctions than the hoped for savings in discovery. Each distinction is fertile for
argument. The point is that discovery is used as a weapon in litigation as a result of courts
allowing the parties to chase all conceivably relevant and train m mquiry documents. The
cost burden of this can be extremely onerous especially in complex commercial litigation.
This is caused m part by the adversary trial process and the need that it sometimes imposes
on a party to prove facts that are within the knowledge of the opponent. Discovery of the
opponents documents can be a way of doing this. There is also a cost mcentive to
encourage discovery and the hope that it may reveal a factual pot of gold. Policies to limit
the abuse of discovery need to be developed. They may be ineffective whilst litigation
occurs under an activity based cost scale and an adversary trial process with rules of
evidence and procedure developed more for criminal jury trials than civil litigation before
a judicial officer alone.
The exchange of witness statements is identified as a cost abuse. The court can require a
party to serve on the other, written statements of oral evidence, and these can be treated as
evidence-in-chief. A report from the Commercial Court Users Committee in February

1995 was generally in agreement that the rule was having a devastating effect on costs,
because the statements were being treated by the parties as documents which had to be as
precise as pleadings and which went through many drafts. A judge put the problems thus:
"...an enormous amount of time is now spent by lawyers ironing and massaging
witness statements; that is extremely expensive for clients and the statements can
bear very little relation to what a witness of fact would actually say. Second, they
can produce an unfair result because a witness can be unfairly caught saying
something contrary to that which a lawyer has put in his statement. It may not be
dishonesty but in experience in checking lengthy statements, that leads to being in
court, and time is taken up in the trial trying to resolve which it is.

For the

exchange also allows lawyers to spend hours preparing cross-examination and can
thus lead to prolix cross-examination."^^

An example by one QC mdicated in one case that £100,000 had been expended in
preparing statements.^^ The report still recommends the exchange of witness statements to
obviate the need to develop pleadings or seek to administer interrogatories and to assist
settlement before trial. Witness statements should not be required in small claims and only
a succinct summary of evidence in the fast track. In the multi track parties will be entitled
to provide a summary, identifying the witnesses and the principal topics with which they
will deal.

After the case management conference, witness statements should then be

exchanged.

At the trial a party should be entitled to require the witness to amplify

summaries or statements but not raise new matters except with leave. Cross-examination
on the contents of wimess summaries and statements should only be allowed with leave of
the judge. Costs allowed for witness statements should reflect the fact that they are not
intended to be complex documents. It is hard to see in practice how these suggestions
would, in multi track cases, obviate the identified problems of witaess statements
becoming elaborate and too expensive. In Australia civil law reformers are increasingly
suggesting witoess statements as a means of shortening the trial process.''^

These

^^ Ibid p 176, para 7.
^ Ibid p 176, para 8.
^ An example is His Honour Justice DA Ipp "Managing the trial process" (1996) an
unpublished paper delivered to the Litigation Reform Commission conference Brisbane, p
3 where he said "It is now the practice in Western Australia for witness statements to be
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cautionary remarks need to be kept in mind.

The expense and delay caused by experts is discussed and it is suggested that it might help
if they met with a view to reaching agreement. In England, a bar on this being effective
has been the controlling of experts by lawyers to the effect that such agreement must be
referred back to the lawyers for ratification. This same problem exists in Australia. The
appointment of court experts is one proposal. Criticism of this approach is the possibilty
that the expert, not the judge, will, in practice, decide the case.

Increased costs are

incurred by appointing a court expert in addition to the parties' own experts and that court
expert may be unable to deal with the situation where more than one acceptable view can
be held on a particular issue.^"^ Lord Woolf s recommendation is that these matters can be
borne in mind, but there is a substantial role for the court to appomt assessors to assist and
also have reports from experts.^^

In relation to scales of costs the report recommends that, at the commencement of their
retamer, lawyers be obligated to explain to clients how the charges for litigation are
calculated and what the overall costs might be, and if that estimate is likely to be exceeded,
to give reasonable notice of that fact.

Fixed fees for stages in litigation should be

encouraged. Consideration should be given to the position of the unassisted litigant who
succeeds against a legally-aided opponent. The effect of high court fees on litigants of
moderate means needs to be considered. Since the general policy in South Australia is for
legal aid not to apply in civil matters, this concern has little application.

A judgment

agamst a poor litigant with no assets may in practice be unenforceable but the moderately
funded litigant in South Australia takes the greatest risk because he or she will generally
have assets against which the judgment can be enforced. A predictable party/party cost
scale at least makes the extent of the risk predictable.
exchanged and used as evidence in chief... Witness statements provide notice of the
evidence that will be given at the trial by all the witnesses which the parties propose to
call, and they shorten the time spent m hearmg evidence."
^^ Op cit Lord Woolf, p 186 para 21.
^^ In SA the Magistrates court has recently adopted a procedure of sitting with experts to
assist in disputes involving special technical expertise such as building and mechanical
repairs. Generally this is at no charge to the litigants. This initiative is recent and has not
been evaluated in this research.

There is a recommendation that the alternative of payment of money into court be
abolished. This is justified in part on the basis that the lack of security of an offer is no
greater than the lack of certainty of the ability to enforce a judgment.^^ However Woolf
backs away from this in his final report recommending that offers and payment into court
both be allowed. He suggests that offers should be encouraged early by attracting bonuses
of costs and interest.^

The need to modernise terminology and have consistent rules and procedures is mentioned.
He recommends that the claim should plead facts, the remedies claimed, the matters of
law entitling the party to the remedy, and the defence should be required to give any
version of facts that is different from those stated in the claim and plead specific defences.

The need for lawyers to broaden their focus is well put early in the report. Lord Woolf
says:
"In the past in considering what is needed to achieve justice we have tended to
concentrate exclusively on the final product. Lord Devlin drew attention to the
weakness of this approach in his contribution to a BBC series of talks, "What's
Wrong With The Law" (editor Zanda 1970 pages 75-77):

'The fallacy inherent in our high court procedure of civil litigation is just
that - that where the justice is concerned, time and money are no object.
We think of British justice as an ideal into which such sordid
considerations ought not to enter.

We refuse to associate with it such

homely maxims as that half a loaf is better than no bread. But is it right to
cling to a system that offers perfection for a few and nothing at all for the

^^ Op cit Lord Woolf, p 195 (6). It is hard to see the reason for removing this alternative
as long as it is clear, as it is in the South Australian magistrates court rules, that defendants
can make offers which affect costs without the necessity of paying in money. It is
recommended that plaintiff offers be encouraged, which the rules in SA already do. The
proposed penalty for failure to accept a plaintiffs offer which is matched or exceeded at
trial is enhanced interest. Under the SA rules the gap between party/party costs and
solicitor/client costs is used as the penalty.
^^ Op cit Lord WoolfFmal report, p 3.

many? Perhaps: if we could really be sure that our existing system is
perfect. But of course it is not. We delude ourselves if we think that it
always produces the right judgment. Every system contains a percentage
of errors; and if by slightly increasing the percentage of error we can
substantially reduce the percentage of cost it is only the idealist who will
revolt.'"^®
In "Anthony Ogus and reflections on the Woolf interim report"

Ogus makes the point

that the trade-off between accuracy and costs will be a factor in parties choosing between
the court system and alternative dispute resolution services such as arbitration, mediation
or other forms of ADR. Presumably, the rational person with the weaker case will have a
preference for less accurate decision making, smce that will increase the chance of
winning^®.

However, simple market analysis has limitations, firstly due to the

monopolistic character of the court's power to enforce the law; and secondly, because
dispute resolution has the highly singular feature:
"that it is sought and purchased by two (or more) parties whose interests in the
outcome are diametrically opposed: if one party wins, the other loses. This fact,
combined with the adversarial culture in the legal process, means that the parties are
locked into a classic Prisoners' Dilemma situation^^: rationally, each would prefer a
low-cost solution, but each knows that the more she spends, the greater will be her
chance of victory... Moreover, what one party spends will influence the spending
decision of the other, with an obvious spiralling effect on the legal cost. Also, the
client is normally poorly informed regardmg both the prospects of success and the
extent to which those prospects may be enhanced by additional time and effort
Op cit Lord Woolf, p 19 para 5.
(1995) Webb journal of current legal issues, in association with Blackstone Press
Limited Webb JLCL I have not attributed page numbers to the quotes from this thought
provoking article.
This certainly has been my observation in conducting directions hearings.
^^ The prisoners' dilemma is a fashionable economic paradox based on two prisoners,
each faced with the choice of giving evidence against the other and receiving a lenient
sentence in return. If neither ^grasses' the police can only bring evidence to convict
them on a lesser charge for which they would be sentenced to a medium term. Their
joint interests demand silence but individually one would be better off serving self
interest.

devoted to the case by the lawyer.

In other contexts, the usual method of

constraining the principal agent problem is for the contract to contain some term
which generates incentives for the agent loyally to pursue the principal's interest.
But here the very reverse is the case: since lawyers are typically paid by the hour
(all day), they are motivated to prolong the process and add to the client's costs.
The use of the contingent fee in the USA and the arrival of the conditional fee in the
UK may partially solve the problem for plaintiffs (but not defendants). Since these
devices shift the risk of losing from the client to the lawyer, the latter has a stake in
the outcome and will not wish to deploy extra effort where this will not materially
increase the chances of success.

"It should be noted that neither device provides the perfect set of incentives. Under
the contingent fee, the lawyer is motivated to reach an early, and perhaps
inadequate, settlement for the client since he bears all the costs of ftirther work but
gains only part of the benefit... Under the conditional fee the lawyer who takes on a
strong case for the client has the opposite incentive: he knows that, provided he
wms, all the cost of his additional effort is borne by the client."

In relation to the Woolf solution of judicial management and our changing culture away
from adversarial to more inquisitorial, Ogus comments:;
"The standard justifications for the adversarial approach are that it enhances
information flows and exposes inaccuracies and potential excesses in the opponent's
case... But as we have seen, given the combination of the prisoner's dilemma and
the principal agent problem, the dominating effect may rather be to prolong the
process (at excessive cost) and to influence the decision-making process away from
the goal of optimum accuracy... As Tullock has pithily put it, 'in the adversary
proceedings a great deal of the resources are put in by someone who is attempting to
mislead (the court)' (Tullock 1980 page 95). If this is right then transferrmg some of
the controlling power to an external, skilled agent - the judge - would seem to make
good sense..."

The point is made that since Woolf identifies inadequate enforcement of current rules as
one of the present problems why can it be expected that new rules and procedures will be

better enforced. Ogus says
"Lawyers have an interest in complex rules not only because the latter may be
manipulated to benefit their clients but also because they generate an increased
demand for lawyers' services... There is a real danger that an increase of judicial
control will only be effectively achieved... by a dense set of complex rules."

This is the inherent danger of case flow management; many models impose standard
activity requirements on all files with a primary objective of bringing them to a prompt and
orderly trial when in fact they will ultunately settle.

Ogus suggests that greater attention needs to be given to a well-designed set of financial
mcentives. For example, he suggests that: "To deal with excessive requests for discovery
it might be preferable to shift some or all of the cost to the requesting party, rather than
leave it to the judge to appraise the value of the request and rule accordingly..."

Ogus is sceptical about ADR: Firstly, because there is not adequate theoretical analysis
available; secondly, because some research indicated that, although there may be a saving
in costs to the litigants in one perhaps idiosyncratic area of custody disputes, his own
findings in research of this area was that the savings to the litigants were not as much as
the increased cost of providing the services; and thirdly, a perceived relationship between
legal costs and the propensity to litigate. Economic theory and empirical studies suggest
that:
"There is an equilibrium level of court case loads and costs.

If the cost of

proceedings in a particular court is high because, for example, hearings are subject
to considerable delay, the effective stakes of the litigation to the parties are reduced
and at the margin this will deter some from litigatmg. Conversely, if the costs are
reduced that will encourage more to litigate. The obvious but depressing implication
of this for the Woolf proposals is that if they are successful in reducing court costs
that very fact may induce more parties to avoid settlement and ADR and resort
instead to the courts."

This repeats the caution expressed by Blankenburg that the German experience is that

efficiency and certainty of cost recovery can lead to excessive litigiousness.82
Ogus supports the benefit of "greater transparency" of legal cost which facilitates client
decision-making and also leads to greater competition between suppliers and hence reduces
the cost of legal services. However, in Ogus's view: "The core problem in my view is
not so much inadequate information but rather the array of technical and cultural restraints
on competition which afflict legal services."
A.A.S. Zuckerman in "Lord Woolfs Access to Justice..."®^ shares similar concerns.
"Any attempt at rendermg procedure more affordable can and will be defeated by those
with an economic interest in doing so." He expresses the same concern as Ogus
summarised by the prisoners' dilemma with the same conclusion: "Although admirable in
many respects, the indirect strategy that Lord Woolf adopts for controlling multi track
cases has a soft underbelly. This is due to the fact that the economic incentives possessed
by lawyers to complicate litigation remains unaffected. True, judges will have the
authority to resist lawyers' pressure to intensify the litigation process. But a system in
which the courts continually pitch themselves against the lawyers' economic incentives is
bound to be inefficient."^
He discusses the German system and is attracted to the fixed cost scales discussed below.
He briefly attempts to explain away the apparent greater number of judges per head of
population in Germany but acknowledges that these comparisons are difficult. A
comparison between the Netherlands and Germany discussed below strongly suggests that
the German system, for all its virtues has the vice of encouragmg access to justice to the
extent of excessive litigiousness. Regardless of this the different legal culture resulting
from thefixedcost scale in Germany compared to the activity based scale in England is so
stark as to invite the conclusion that he draws: "Attempts to cut down costs by simplifying
procedure, by judicial pressure or by encouragmg clients to resist rising costs have all been
tried and found wanting. There is no alternative to a direct attack on the economic
^ See below A eontinental European perspective.
(1996) 59 The Modem Law Review 773
^ Ibid pp 781 and 786.

incentives to complicate and protract the litigation process.85

A continental European perspective
Professor Erhard Blankenburg has done considerable analysis on the reasons for the
difference in apparent litigiousness in civil matters between Germany and Holland. He
contends that the culture of those societies are sufficiently common that there is no obvious
cultural reason for the quite dramatically greater number of civil claims in Germany
compared to Holland. He gives the following figures:
The Netherlands

West Germany

Summary debt enforcement

705

9,118

Debt enforcement litigation

650

1,570

Landlord/tenant disputes

215

458

Traffic tort

69

247

Labour law cases

586

Figures are per 100,000 of population for 1982-1984.
"The Infi-astructure For Avoiding Civil litigation Conçaring Cultures of Legal Behaviour
in The Netherlands and West Germany", Erhard Blankenburg.^^
Blankenburg posits several reasons for this radical difference. The first, and most
pertinent for this paper, is a difference on the basis upon which legal fees are charged
between the two jurisdictions. Legal fees in the Netherlands are charged on a time charge
basis and, as such, are not predictable and are not recoverable on a party/party basis unless
the court, for particular reasons, orders it. In Germany, costs are calculated on a
predictable scale and are recoverable by the successful litigant, against the loser, in full.
He also suggests that the Dutch legal culture offers more alternatives to trial resolution and
Ibid p 796.
^ (1994) 28 Law and Society Review No 4, pp 789 and 797.

more precourt conflict institutions than the German culture.^ In the summary debt
enforcement area, the figures reflect the fact that in the Netherlands there is a private
bailiffs system, allowing for the enforcement of small debts outside the court system. He
also suggests that in 1984, when court fees were raised, access to the court for debt
collecting reduced. Potential plaintiffs had greater recourse to computer-automated
reminders together with additional charges for late payment.^ He makes the point that the
more courts offer quick and easy access, the more they will be used for subsequent
adversary litigation, and the converse is: "The higher courts set the threshold of access the
more they will stunulate out of court alternatives and the more these are professionally
regulated, the better they can guarantee standards of due process comparable to those of
courts of j u s t i c e T h e Magistrates Court in South Australia has decided that the better
approach is to keep all dispute resolution under the court imibrella, where we can ensure
that there are adequate standards of due process. However, the point is well made that the
courts should ensure that, under its umbrella, non-litigation resolution of disputes should
be encouraged.
Professor Blankenburg also contends that the better ftinding of Dutch consumer
organisations and also the greater availability of consumer and quasi legal advice in
Holland as compared to Germany, diverts casesfromthe court system.
"We observe a recurring pattern however, which is due partly to the institutions
filtering access to courts and partly to alternatives that help to avoid them. Part of
the infrastructure of avoidance is facilitated by the multimde of forms of legal
consultation available within and outside the Bar. Legal advice is not an attorneys'
monopoly which allows legal costs insurance, automobile clubs or trade unions to
compete with law firms. On the other side there are individual as well as
institutional government subsidies for legal aid which for the past 15 years enabled
"social advocates" to offer low threshold legal services. Amazingly enough, the
abundance of legal advisers fits into a culture of especially low, rather than high,
litigation frequency... In Germany, on the other hand, courts appear to be too
Ibid p 799.
«« Ibid p 799.
Ibid p 800.

efficient and inexpensive to create incentives for plaintiffs to avoid them. In civil
courts half the plaintiffs have a decision within six months...summary proceedmgs
are even faster. It is mainly the business community that profits from having a quick
and effective instrument for collecting debts, regulating accidents and threatening
tenants with eviction; as they usually win their cases, the defendants pay all the
fees."

This experience echoes the concern previously expressed by Franaszek that a small
reduction in costs will merely allow greater use of the court system by those who ahready
had access to it.

"The decisions of plamtiffs to use or avoid courts are based on similar strategic
reasons on both sides of the border. What differs are the incentives their respective
legal systems offer. The infrastructure which provides access as well as alternatives
to litigation creates the conditions for invoking or avoiding the courts".^

Now here is a radical contrast to conventional wisdom. Implicit in this is that greater
justice is done by putting barriers to entry to rapacious, debt-collecting plaintiffs. A
resolution by litigation should be unsatisfactory and expensive. Perhaps that is overstating
the view of Professor Blankenburg, but it certainly gives a different perspective from one
American view that, in encouragmg litigation to the end, court judgments necessarily
increase the social utility and justice for society. It is interesting to note that the certainty
of costs in the German system is seen to be a major factor in the greater use of the judicial
system as compared to the Netherlands.

It amply demonstrates that today's solutions may become tomorrow's problems if reforms
are adopted with excessive vigour and without balancing policies to prevent obvious abuses
of the reformed processes.
unexpected consequences.

^ Ibid p 807.

Even then a watchful eye must be kept open looking for

German cost scales

Since the German cost scales have attracted favourable comment I pause to briefly
describe them. ^^
The basic rule in German civil procedure is that costs follow the result of litigation. In
contrast to the situation in Australia, the biggest problem is seen in the continuously
increasing number of actions.^
No special rule exists for small claims, though it is admitted that the party/party costs are
inadequate to fully compensate a lawyer on minor matters, but they are expected to carry
this on a swings and roundabouts basis.^
Contingency fees are prohibited. Likewise, lawyers are not allowed to charge below the
standard fee. They are allowed to charge above the standard fee but only if a clear,
written agreement with the client, permitting that, is obtained.
The party/party costs and standard lawyers' fees are similar (ignoring the instance where
there is a specific agreement to entitle a lawyer to charge more). Party/party costs are
payable by fee units. To take a matter to trial, party/party costs of three fee units are
incurred. One fee unit is incurred on the issue of the claim (and that is the amount
recoverable if it settles early). The second fee unit is chargeable at a hearing, and the third
fee unit is chargeable if the lawyer represents his or her party while the evidence is taken .
There are strong disincentives to prolixity. The same amount is recoverable, regardless of
how long the trial takes and regardless of how many hearmg dates occur. The lawyer "has
no economic interest in expanding the evidence".^ There is a fee uplift for achieving an
out-of-court settlement. The scale fees fixed in 1994 are three units or the party/party
costs payable to the successful party at the end of a trial in which they were represented
^^ These comments are from Dieter Leipold "Lhniting Costs For Better Access To Justice
- The German Experience" chapter 14 in Zuckerman and Cranston, Reform of Civil
Procedure, Essays on Access to Justice Clarendon Press - Oxford 1995.
^ Ibid p 267.
^ Ibid p 272.
^ Ibid pp 271 and 272.

and oral evidence was called are: For a claim of DM5,000, DM480; on a claim of
DM10,000, DM705; on a claim of DM20,000, DM1,155; and on a claim of DM50,000,
DM1,965. In February 1996, the exchange rate of Australian dollars to Deutschmarks was
approximately equal so, as a rough standard of comparison, these figures can be converted
into Australian dollars. The Magistrates Court scale offers party/party costs on a routine
action of the order of 30% to the end of the first day of trial. The party/party costs under
the German system range from 9.6% on a claim of $5,000 declining to 4% on a claim of
$50,000. The American experience including cases that settled is that the plaintiffs actual
costs were 30% (presumably the costs for cases that went to trial would be much higher))
In addition to these fees, witness and court fees are payable, as is the case in South
Australia. One difference is that, in Germany the court calls and pays the witnesses' fees,
however it will only call a witness whom a party wants to be called if it is funded for the
costs of that witness.
There is a suggestion in the commentary that the fees on appeal may be rather high and
hence encourage lawyers to recommend appeals to build up costs. Apparently the number
of appeals is very high.^ The legal aid system in Germany fiinds civil litigation but pays
the lawyer less than the standard rate set out above. An assessment of prospects of
winning the claim in made before a grant of legal aid is made.
There is an incentive to the lawyer to win in relation to a legally-aided client, because the
party/party costs are greater than the funding of legal aid for the client.

Australian commentaries
The Access to Justice Advisory Committee Report Access to Justice, an Action Plan
(commonly known and described in this document as "the Sackville Report") drew
together several lines of parliamentary and other inqunies under a general term of
reference to "consider ways in which the legal system could be reformed in order to
enhance access to justice and make the legal system, fairer and more effective"^ and
^ See the first page of this chapter.
^ Op cit Dieter Leipold p 273.
^ The Sackville Report p V.

again, to make the justice system "fairer, simpler and more affordable".^^ As the name of
the report implies, it sets out an action plan for reforming the justice system to achieve
three objectives:
• Equality of access to legal services;
• National equity; and
• Equality before the law.
Implicit in the report is that the goals in the court system of cheapness and speed are
desirable. Under the heading "Some qualifications", the report acknowledges that it may
be impossible to resolve disputes cheaply, swiftly and also fairly. The Sackville Report
does not confront the concern identified by Professor Blankenburg, that a cheap and
efficient legal system gives greater power to the akeady powerfiil members of society to
enforce their rights against the rest and results in excessive litigiousness at considerable
expense to the community.It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the
conundrum that removing barriers to justice may in fact not empower the disadvantaged in
society but, rather, fiirther empower the powerful. In relation to costs, the Sackville
Report recommends the abolition of fee scales, subject to preconditions intended to
improve competition in the legal services market, to require disclosure of information to
clients and to provide a speedy and accessible system for receiving and investigating
complaints about lawyers. Lawyers and clients should enter written costs agreements "those agreements should govern the dealings between lawyers and clients unless the
agreements are unfair or the lawyer's charges under them are unreasonableThis, of
course, is a contradiction. If costs are to be regulated by written fee agreements rather
than fee scales, well and good. However, unless one has fee scales, it is impossible to say
that lawyers' charges under those costs agreements are unfair and/or unreasonable. In the
event the Sackville Report recommended that the Australian Law Reform Commission
Ibid pp XXiii to Xxiv- this phrase is from each of the four headings of the terms of
reference.
99 Ibid p XXX.
^^ Blankenburg reports 2 1/2- 12 times more civil suits in Germany compared to the
Netherlands. See The continental European experience above in this chapter.
Ibid pp XXXiv and XXXv.

investigate the cost issue. It has done so. The original Issues Paper^®^ canvassed a very
wide set of options, but the final report Costs shifting- who pays for litigation?^^^ suggested
fairly conservative recommendations to the effect of maintaining the status quo of costs
following the event, subject to disciplinary or case management cost orders, special rules
relating to public interest proceedings, and the power of the court to dispense with
party/party costs if the risk of paying the other party's costs will materially and adversely
affect the ability of a party to present his or her case or negotiate a fair settlement.

The point is made that the tax deductibility of legal expenses in the hands of business,
gives it an unfair advantage in litigation.

The report suggests the adoption by courts of differentiated case management, namely a
system which distinguishes between and treats differently simple and complex cases, can
achieve important benefits, in particular... an increase in early settlement of cases... more
efficient management of cases and reduced litigation c o s t s . T h e s e reforms are
recommended and a careful evaluation of their effectiveness is suggested. Some of the
reforms the subject of evaluation in this thesis meet this description.

Williams Goldsmith and Browne, The cost of civil litigation before intermediate courts in
Australia^^ is a review of the cost of civil litigation in the District Courts of Queensland
and Victoria (known as the County Court). It is an analysis of where the cost of litigation
was incurred in those courts and how the practice and procedure might be modified to
reduce the resource of cost of litigation without sacrificing the ability of the courts to
produce just results. It is interesting to note that the delay between the commencement of
proceedings and ultimate disposition is not a factor in the level of cost (i.e. greater trial
delay does not mean greater cost^^). The strongest influence is the stage at which the case

^^ Issues Paper No. 13.
^^ Australian Law Reform Commission report no75.
^^ Op cit The Sackville Report p XLiii.
Published under the auspices of the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration
(AUA) in 1992.
This is contradicted in Guest and Murphy Economic Evaluation of Differential Case
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is finalised (i.e. settle early, save costs). The report also notes a relatively high cx)st of
expert medical reports and a marked difference between those costs in Queensland
conq)ared to Victoria, where the cost is greater. It is suggested that rules governing
disclosure of reports and cost rules encourage multiple medical reports in Victoria. This is
a good example of how the level of costs can be affected by the local legal culture. Noone can seriously suggest that medical injuries are harder to assess in Victoria than they
are in Queensland. It is just that Queensland accepts a system of assessment that is
cheaper. Finally, where afirmhas considerable expertise in a particular type of litigation,
its costs are less. This, of course, helps defendants in personal injury matters, where
insurers take advantage of this.^®'
Coiiclusions
The conventional litigation process in Australia is too expensive and needs to be reformed
to reduce cost of litigation to the parties. However a litigation process that is too cheap
and efficient can result in too ready resort to litigation to resolve disputes. This is a
salutary warning that extreme solutions may become the next problems. Alternative
dispute resolution is fashionable and may offer a way out of disputes that has dynamics and
results quite distinct from the conventional adjudicatory litigation path. If it achieves an
early settlement it may save costs. However ADR is not a universal panacea for problems
with the conventional litigation process. Lind and others in The perception of Justice.
Tort litigants' views of trial, court- annexed arbitration and judicial settlement conferences
concluded "litigation cost, whether absolute or relative to subjective standards, showed no
substantial relationship to perceived fairness or satisfaction among these tort litigants...
Contrary to commonly held assumptions, we found that trial engendered higher levels of
Management (Civil Justice Research Centre, November 1995). The basis of the
contradiction is that for an 'economic evaluation' using 'cost benefit analysis' delayed
payments must be discounted back to dollar equivalents at the base year. The real discount
rate recommended by the Department of Finance was 8% pa in 1991 (p 8). Accordingly
all delayed awards and settlements must be discounted by 8% pa and this is regarded as a
cost to the plaintiff (but not a benefit to the defendant wrongdoer). It is open to question
whether this was still an appropriate discount rate in 1994 the base year for this survey (p
22). However the purpose of the policies the subject of my research is to encourage exit
from litigation earlier in the process, which will be earlier in time and thus, on the basis
of this research will further reduce the cost to litigants.
^^ Op cit Williams Goldsmith and Browne, Executive Summary p Xi.

perceived control and participation as well as higher levels of litigant comprehension...
The data suggests that tort litigants do not view trials as lessening their involvement in the
legal process, but rather as increasing their involvement."^®^

Perceptions of unbiased,

careful and dignified procedures were more important for system and outcome satisfaction
than cost or delay. Care must be taken to ensure that innovations intended to reduce cost
and delay do not do so at the expense of those qualities of the judicial process that are
more important to litigants. The Judiciary has a unique function in the adjudication and
enforcement of civil claims. However if it fails to deliver on this process but rather diverts
all cases to ADR techniques (over which it does not have control) then the very reason for
the judiciary's existence and its claim on society's resources may cease to exist.

The

problem with the conventional litigation process is that as we presently conduct it, it is too
expensive. Rather than just seeking cheaper alternatives we should also be seeking ways
of making it more affordable, bearing in mind the risks of thereby encouraging excessive
litigation.

It is typical that 93% of cases do not proceed to verdict. These litigants will save costs if
they leave the process earlier. To encourage this they should be informed about the
process, the costs of it and the alternatives. To enable rational choice it is essential that
cost scales result in costs that are certain and predictable.

Litigants should be offered

multiple exit pomts from the litigation path both before litigation is commenced and during
the process so that those that will leave without a verdict do so earlier in the process at
lower cost to them.

This may ensure that any mcreased tendency to use the courts is

ameliorated by opportunities to escape the process. The process should not be too linear,
leading inexorably to a greater and greater cost burden before the first chance to escape at
a conciliation (pretrial) conference and then follows the trial itself.

By then the cost

burden has often overwhehned the dispute. The remaining challenge is then to reform the
trial process itself for the remaming 7% to ensure that the virtues of the adversary process
are not overwhehned by its vices which can lead to prolix trials where parties are put to
proof often on trite issues or matters within the knowledge of their opponent and the view
of the forest is lost in hard fought battles over every tree. The trial process itself is beyond
the policies discussed in this thesis.

See above under the heading The United States of American experience.

This job must be done. Access to an independent court system is a keystone of our
democratic system. At the present its expense denies access to it for most of our society.

CHAPTER 4
AN EVALUATION OF THE NINETY DAY PREACTION NOTICE
To assess the effectiveness of the rule requiring 90 days preaction notice in personal injury
claims, data has been obtained from SGIC, and lawyers have been interviewed about the
notice.
SGIC are the compulsory third party insurer in South Australia. As such they conduct the
defence of the overwhelming majority of personal injury claims arisingfrommotor vehicle
accidents. It was at the instigation of the Commission that the 90 day rule was
introduced. Statistical datafromthe Commission has been analysed to ascertain the extent
to which the clear reduction in personal injury motor vehicle claims which have been filed
in the courts is attributable to the 90 day rule as opposed to other factors.
The data and graphical analysis of it is in Appendix C. This shows that a steady increase
in the ratio of medico-legal expense to total payout and delay in closing files both peaked
in 1991/2 when this trend was reversed and by 1993/4 both the ratio and the delay had
been reduced significantly^®^. Further reduction in both is evident in 1994/5. The obvious
cause of this is the setdement of claims earlier before incurring some of the medico-legal
costs infilinga claim and taking it through the court proceedings to settlement or trial. An
example is that between 1991/2 and 1994/5 the net amount payable to claimants (after
deducting all medico-legal costs paid by SGIC and cost of assessors, private investigators
and police reports) as a percentage of the total amount paid out increased from 11% to
83%. The defendant legal costs were reduced from nearly $18m to $llm and the plaintiff
legal costsfromnearly $23m to $12m. In the same period, due probably to the cappmg of
damages by the Wrongs Act,"° the payout to claimants reduced. In the same period the
average age of the files closed decreased from 31 months to 25 months. These figures
would tend to understate the reductions because they are an analysis offilesclosed in each
year and include many older files which have not been exposed to the new settlement
strategy. The reductions were clearly evident by 1993/4. The rule amendment was not
^^ I have not researched the reason for the cost increase leading up to the peak in
1991/2. The District Court introduced caseflowmanagement in 1990 which was too late
to have contributed to those cost increases.
This is discussed m Chapter 2.

introduced until the end of 1993. The time lag implicit in these figures suggests that to
have achieved the reduction evident by then was due to the efforts of the SGIC settlement
team and where the plaintiff was represented, a co-operative approach between the
settlement team and the lawyers rather than the rule change itself.
In 1994/5 SGIC settled 3800 claims and they did not mstruct solicitors to act m 2556, ie
67% of them. No comparative data in other years for these figures is available but such a
high percentage is further indication of the fact that many of these claims were settled
before proceedings were filed.The number of claims where court proceedings have
been commenced has steadily declined. In 1995 only one quarter the number of cases
were commenced as in 1989. Over the same period all types of accident and particularly
casualty accidents have shown only a slight decline. A comparison of casualty accidents
and actions commenced in court shows that the actions commenced have reduced
disproportionately"^. There may be a time lag of up to three years between the accident
and the commencement of the claim in court"^ but that does not explam the fall in the
latter. It is clear that the SGIC settlement team has been highly successfiil in settling
claims before a case has been commenced in court.
Lawyers from firms specialising in plaintiff and defendant personal injury work, and other
lawyers who work in thefieldhave been interviewed about the effect of this initiative.""^
The unanimous view was that the establishment by SGIC of a settlement conference team
to deal with the backlog of cases in the District Court, which then aggressively attempted
to settle cases before proceedings were issued, was highly successful. The team is
regarded as experienced and practical and the offers for damages realistic. The settlement
team takes its own legal advice in many cases and is willing on occasions to offer more
than the amount recommended by its own solicitors in a pragmatic approach that it is
cheaper in the long run to pay a little more to settle a claim before proceedings are issued
than to pay a lesser amount later. This may incur more in costs than the "saving". The
When a claimant files proceedings it is SGIC practice to instruct solicitors.
Appendixe.
There is a limitation period of three years in commencing these claims. This can be
extended but the overwhehning majority are commenced within the limitation period.
A sample questionnaire around which the interviews were loosely based is in

perception from both plaintiff and defendant lawyers is that they settle a "huge" number of
claims before legal proceedings are commenced.
Plaintiff lawyers expressed the view that this was much better for their clients. A realistic
preclaim settlement saves stress and delay. It is obvious that it saves costs to both sides.
Some thought the offers for the plaintiff's costs were adequate but some that they were
rather low.
There are some litigants who will only be satisfied with a court determined result. They
are the exception.
The 90 day rule reinforced and institutionalised this change in approach. "The culture
already had evolved that way." A level of trust and respect has built up between the SGIC
settlement team and the plaintiff lawyers I interviewed. They saw this as the reason for the
success of the new approach and the effect of the rule change as largely coincidental. The
point was made that the rule does militate against cynical plaintiff lawyers who otherwise
might issue a claim before negotiatmg just to build up costs. However some said the rule
is not rigorously enforced. Some plaintiffs apparently have been allowed their costs even
though they were in breach of the rule. This is not seen as a bad thing (by either side) but
was mentioned to make the pomt that it is not the rule change that has caused the early
settlements. It was the establishment by SGIC of a credible, competent settlement team
making realistic offers and the acceptance by the legal profession of this cultural shift.
This is remforced by the reported experience with other msurers who do not make any
realistic offer in response to the preaction notice but contmue "to play hard ball and die in
the trenches over every claim".^^^ This indicates that the rule change by itself may not
have achieved the success of settling so many cases before proceedings were filed in a
court. However in conjunction with a proactive approach by SGIC to settle claims at the
earliest possible time, early settlements have been achieved. This has substantially reduced
Appendix E together with a description of the lawyers interviewed.
^^^ Quotmg a plaintiffs' lawyer. This view is supported by the fact that data collected for
general claims in 1996 (discussed in chapter 5) showed 3 tunes as many non SGIC
personal injury claims settled by the end of the dkections hearing. The much lower
proportion of SGIC claims that settled at this stage is consistent with SGIC havmg settled
many before proceedings issued.

the cost burden to the litigants. On SGIC's figures the total legal costs paid in 1994/5
were $17.5m less than the total costs paid in 1991/2."^ This does not include plaintiffs'
solicitor client costs so it would significantly under state the saving. If SGIC has been
relatively generous with its settlement offers that may have had the effect of some money
which might otherwise have been spent on medico-legal costs being spent on the plaintiffs'
damages. It is not within the scope of this paper to assess the implications of that but I
suggest that in the context of the substantial reduction to general damages imposed by
statute there is no social harm if this small transfer has occurred.

The substantial statute imposed reduction in general damages for personal injuries arising
from motor vehicle accidents in 1987 has reduced the economic attraction of litigating and
has assisted SGIC in being apparently generous relative to the reduced entitlement. This
may have been a factor in the apparent success of the 90 day preaction notice.

Even

allowing for this, the initiative has been a significant success in reducing costs to the
litigants. The success was a result of the cultural change in approach by SGIC not just the
rule change.

See Appendix C. Allowing for inflation the real saving is in fact higher.

CHAPTERS
AN EVALUATION OF BETTER INFORMING LITIGANTS AND OFFERING
MEDIATION
The prime determinant of costs to a litigant is the stage of the proceedmgs at which they
finalise the case. It is obvious enough that the further down the path to trial one goes, the
more legal work is done and the expense increases. Research by Williams suggested this"^
and it was confirmed in recent research by Worthington and Baker.Disbursements,
experts' reports and the parties' own expenses in gathering evidence increase the further
down the path they tread. Ninety three percent or more will be finalised without a judicial
determination at trial.

The purpose of making the parties attend a directions hearing at

the beginning of the process, giving them clear advice, offering mediation and having a
magistrate assess the file and give that advice is to save some of the parties costs by
settling earlier. How effective has that been?
Data analysis
All cases commenced between 1 September 1992 and 30 November 1992 which were
defended were analysed by type, point of disposal in the litigation process and delay in
disposal. This was for the purpose of developing benchmarking standards. It provides a
data baselme for the procedures mtroduced m July 1992. These procedures were well
settled by then. The new procedure of requiring attendance of litigants in person at the
first directions hearing to advise them of the nature of the litigation process and to offer the
alternative of mediation was introduced on 6 May 1996. From that day when a defence
was filed a notice appointing a time for a directions hearing about 4 weeks after the
defence was sent. All the parties were required to attend in person. In general claims a
magistrate conducted all these directions hearings rather than a court officer as had been
the case previously.^^ To evaluate the effect of this initiative all cases defended between 1
Williams Goldsmith & Browne The cost of civil litigation before intermediate courts in
Australia (AUA, Melbourne, 1992).
Worthington and Baker The costs of civil litigation (Civil justice research centre, 1993)
p62.

From the 1992 sample of general jurisdiction cases discussed in this chapter.
^^ In small claims the directions hearing was a new procedural step. These were
conducted by senior court staff. The effect of this change is discussed in the next chapter.

May 1996 and 31 July 1996 were analysed in the same way as the 1992 sample. All these
cases were dealt with under the new procedure. It is fair to say that the new procedures
were not fully settled when the cases at the beginning of the sample went through the new
processes. Indeed at a client consultative committee meeting^^^ on 25 September 1996 the
criticisms were made that at the first directions hearing magistrates were failing to enforce
the requirement that parties attend in person and were not directly informing the parties of
the litigation process, cost issues or the option of mediation. These same criticisms recur
in the results of the interviews of lawyers.

The effectiveness of any significant policy

change depends in part on it being accepted by the players in the system. As noted in the
above discussion of the 90 day preaction notice in personal injury claims the cultural
change can be as important as the rule change. However despite the fact that this initiative
was introduced only on a trial basis, without any substantial effort to ensure its acceptance
by the legal profession and apparently magistrates on occasions might have failed to fulfil
the aspirations of the new system to better inform litigants, the comparative data shows
that under the new system many cases have settled earlier in the process than they did
under the previous system. The term 'settled' covers various events closing a file such as
discontinued, settled, default judgment, dismissed, summary judgment etc.

I have

generally preferred 'finalised' in this text. For these purposes a case transferred to another
jurisdiction is regarded as a finalised case for this court.

It is not finalised from the

parties' point of view but if the transfer occurs earlier less costs are wasted in the wrong
court. In the 1996 sample only 3% were transferred. These are not separately identified
in the 1992 sample but were probably even less as the movement of files at that time was
from the District Court to the Magistrates Court rather than the other way.

The results of the samples and graphical analysis of them is in Appendix D. Some cases
are finalised before the directions hearing.

The directions hearing is sometimes

adjoumed^^ but the end result of the directions hearing is that the case is finalised or it
moves to the next stage in the process.
conference.

Under the 1992 system this was a conciliation

After 6 May 1996 this was either a mediation hearing or conciliation

^^^ This is a committee of senior Magistrates Court personnel and legal practitioners who
regularly use the civil division of the court whose purpose is to provide feedback about the
operations of the court.
^^ These statistics were taken at the last directions hearing.

conference. In the 1992 sample 84% went to a conciliation conference, 2% did not have a
classified result^^^ and 14% were finalised. The 1996 sample showed a quite different
profile by the end of this first stage in the litigation process. The proportion finalised had
risen two and a half times to 35%. Only 38% had gone to mediation or conciliation.
However due to the recent collection of the data another 12% had not left the directions
hearing stage of the process.^^ Even if all these go to mediation or conciliation (an
unlikely event) 21% more were finalised by the end of the directions hearing under the
new process. Although the rules of court allow lawyers not to fiilly prepare for trial by the
conciliation conference (and the interviews of lawyers confirm they do not) it is clear that
significant costs are saved by a settlement at the directions hearing rather than at a
subsequent mediation or conciliation. A settlement at a court annexed mediation hearing
should also be cheaper to the parties than a settlement at a conciliation conference. This
was the view of lawyers whose clients had tried mediation successfiilly. It is commonsense that less will be spent on discovery and other pretrial steps when the parties agree to
attempt to mediate at a hearing which the court makes available only about three weeks
after the agreement to do this at the directions hearing. On the court party/party scale this
cost reduction on a claim for $10,000 would be $700.^^ However mediation typically
takes three hours which is rather longer than a typical conciliation conference which would
typically take one hour. If the parties take their lawyers to the mediation the costs saved
would to this extent be diminished (by say 2 hours x $180= $360) leavmg a small saving
of the order of $340 and greater for bigger clauns. If mediation settled a case that
otherwise would have gone to trial the savings would have been substantial. It is of course
impossible to ascertain what would have been the destiny of a case had it not settled at
^^^ Category 'other'- this data was collected 31/5/94, 18 months after the last file was
commenced. These cases may have been finalised by means not otherwise specified in the
data collection or not finalised in personal injury matters for reasons such as injuries not
having stabilised or awaiting the outcome of criminal proceedings or parallel compensation
claims elsewhere such as in the workcover tribunal.
^^ The data has been updated to late October. It is not surprising that a sample of cases
defended as late as July are not either finalised, set for trial nor ready for conciliation or
mediation for the reasons noted in the previous footnote.
^^ See Appendix I- plaintiffs bill of costs- item 8- 2x$200 = $400, item 9- $100,
itemlO- $50, item 11- $30, item 20- $80, item 21- $40= $700. The saving on a claim
for $60,000 on the routine scale calculated for the same items would be $1,400.

mediation. In the sample of general cases only 10 (4.5%) chose mediation/^^ 5 of these
did not settle and went direct from mediation to trial, 3 were finalised at mediation and the
other two had not been finalised either way.

A mediation is adjourned usually to

investigate a possible settlement so it is possible that the settlement rate may rise to 50%
which is slightly lower than the general success rate on the mediators' own figures
discussed below. On these figures mediation contributed a further 2% of cases that settled
early as a result of the new processes. Cases that do not settle at mediation do not re-enter
the conventional trial path but proceed direct to trial. Those going from mediation to trial
will have incurred extra costs by going to trial by this course rather than by the
conventional path through a conciliation conference^^^. The percentage going to mediation
was small and the cost effect on those was likewise small.

Between 1 May and 30

September 1996 figures kept by the court mediation officer show that he conducted 58
mediations with a settlement and other disposal rate of approximately 50%^^®. In addition
to the cases from the samples mediations occurred in cases where the defence was filed
before the samples were taken. The modest take up rate for mediation suggests that the
attempt to inform the litigants of the option of mediation failed or mediation as presented
was unattractive to one of the parties in each case or their advisers.^^^ The interviews
revealed that information on mediation was given to their clients by a large proportion of
the lawyers and the information given to the parties at the directions hearing was generally
^^ Of the cases that chose mediation 5 were classified as debt, 1 equity, 1 contract, 1
personal injury, 1 motor vehicle property damage and 1 workers lien (building
subcontractor against owner). The contract dispute and 2 debt matters were finalised.
Mediations in building disputes were conducted by a magistrate. The court has a recent
practice of conducting mediations/ evaluations in these matters using its own expert.
^^^ As noted above if lawyers attend a mediation each parties' extra costs compared to a
conciliation conference are of the order of $360.
^^ He conducted 58 mediations to the end of September. 21 of these were m general
matters, 19 reached a mediated agreement and 11 were finalised due to non attendance of
parties due to settlements reached between the parties or other reasons. le 30 were
finalised. Over the period of 5 months 16 mediations were adjourned, some to allow terms
agreed between the parties to be carried out. Some of these will not yet have been
recorded as a settlement or subsequent non attendance. Thus the figure of 50% of cases
referred to mediation having settled is conservative and information from the mediator
suggests as high as 75% ultunately may be finalised.
^^^ A report in the Victorian "Magistrates Information Bulletin" (December 1996), p 9 on
the Victorian Portals mediation scheme showed a monthly average of defended cases
referred to mediation between October 1995 and October 1996 of 4.2%. This is notably
similar to the 4.5% reported in this SA data.

well understood. There was not a significant difference in the rate of opting for mediation
between small claims and general claims.The decision to try mediation was made at the
directions hearing. In small claims this was conducted by senior court staff (usually the
mediator) without lawyers representmg the parties. In general claims it was conducted by
a magistrate with lawyers generally representmg the parties. Despite these differences the
inertia in favour of the conventional litigation path existed for both.
Another significant change in the 1996 sample is that 15% of cases went direct to trial
without trying either mediation or conciliation because at least one party thought there was
no prospect of success and the magistrate agreed. If the assessment that they had no
prospect of settling without going to trial was correct, bypassing the usual conciliation
conference would itself have saved these parties the cost of their lawyer reading the file
and attending, plus their own costs of attendmg. It also reduced delay.^^^ That however is
more properly regarded as a cost saving consequent upon the court's flexible case flow
management system which is discussed below .
The profile of the types of cases changed between 1992 and 1996. This is prmcipally due
to the dramatic drop in claims for damages for personal injury from 43% in the 1992
sample to 19% in 1996. The profile of the other cases is fairly consistent. This drop m
personal injury claims is to be expected due to the operation of the 90 day preaction notice
and the efforts of the SGIC settlement team discussed in Chapter 4. The efforts of the
settlement team had its effect too late to significantly affect the sample of 1992 cases. It is
appropriate to leave personal injury cases in that sample because they are cases that had no
special attempt to settle them before the claim was issued. The remaining personal injury
claims in the 1996 sample, will have had the preaction notice given to the insurer for the
defendant and in most a preaction conference in an attempt at settlement. They are
therefore cases that are not likely to settle and so are not a fair test of the new procedures
designed to encourage an early settlement. Only 2 out of 26 (7.6%) motor vehicle
personal injury claims had settled at or before the directions hearing at the time of
collecting the data compared to other personal injury claims where 4 out of 17 (23%) had
The mediators' figures show 2/4 general/small claims. In the 3month sample the
ratio of defences was 2/5 general/small claims.
^^^ The scale fee for attendance is $80- $150 and the actual fee may exceed that. The
delay would be reduced by about 4 weeks.

settled. ^^^ This supports the earlier conclusion that SGIC is more effective in using the
preaction notice to settle cases than other insurers. Personal injury claims were 19% of the
1996 sample and if these had been excluded the ahready notable improvement m settlement
rates would have been further enhanced.

There have been five magistrates in the court from 1992 (and long before) until 1996.
Three have been there for all that period, one joined the court at the beginning of 1994 and
one this year. There is no reason to suspect that these personnel changes affected the
manner or time of disposal of cases. The magistrates in the court work closely as a team
which has been important in the effective introduction of procedural changes.

The amount saved by litigants who settle at the directions hearing stage rather than the
conciliation conference or later in the litigation process is hard to precisely quantify but it
is considerable. The court party/party cost scale is not an accurate reflection of actual
costs in each case and interviews with solicitors suggest it is lower than actual costs. A
specialist costing solicitor suggested it is near the mark for personal injury cases, low for
complicated commercial causes and generous for routine debt collections. As such it gives
a median indication of the costs incurred. On the basis of the first example costing in
Appendix I the costs between the first directions hearing and the court steps ready for the
first day of trial are $2,120. This is based on a judgement for $10,000 and they increase
by more than 10% of any excess over that sum. The parties are not required to be fully
prepared for trial at the conciliation conference. Indeed the lawyers' interviews discussed
below indicate most of the trial preparation costs are not incurred until it is clear that the
case will not settle, ie after the conciliation conference. The scale fee for trial preparation
is $1,000 so if that is deducted it is a conservative estimate that the costs of each party
saved by settling at a directions hearing rather than the conciliation conference could be
more than $1,000. If the settlement would have been on the court steps the saving is
double that. This saving was 10%- 20% each, or to both parties combined 20%- 40% of
the amount of their dispute. This is a broad axe conservative estimate of their legal costs.
Their own costs in gathering evidence for their lawyers, costs of obtaining any

5 of each were still at directions which was 42% of the cases still at directions although
these cases were only 19% of the original sample. In total 6 out of the 43 personal injury
cases finalised- only 14% compared to 35% finalised of the total sample.

professional evidence that might have been required and the personal costs of the stress of
the litigation process were also saved. The result was achieved two to three months
earlier. By any measure these reductions in the cost to parties are significant.
Methodology
A computer record is kept of all court files. The computer captured both samples of files.
The data was taken from the hard copy of the file wherever that was available to minimise
data errors. Where the file was not available^^^ the computer record of the file was used.
The data was entered on an MS Excel spreadsheet. The type of case and the result at each
stage was recorded by number code. The date of each step in the process and of final
disposal was recorded. The data entry of the 1992 sample was done by an experienced
court officer and checked at that time. The data entry of the 1996 sample was done by a
casual employee. The general claims data entry was checked by the author and the small
claims data entry has been checked by experienced court staff.
Party interviews
The party interviews were conducted by court staff by telephone.

They used the

questionnaires set out in Appendix F. Information from parties in small claims has been
extrapolated to this discussion of general claims where it is appropriate. Parties who
settled at a directions hearing, parties who tried mediation and parties who declined
mediation have been interviewed. Those who declined did so because they believed they
were entitled to succeed in full and saw no reason to compromise or their assessment was
that the other side were unreasonable, obsessive or it had become a matter of principle
(about half). The rest said they were willing to mediate but the other side was not.^^"^
Those who chose mediation did so because they saw it as less terrifying, less antagonistic,
good business to be seen as flexible, amicable, honest and several also because it saved
time and the cost of preparing for trial which they had discussed with their lawyers. It is
clear that some were very pleased to have the opportunity to resolve the dispute away from
lawyers and outside the trial process. Those who settled their case were not only satisfied
but generally full of praise for the directions hearing and mediation process.

^^^ Active files are constantly on the move and can be hard to capture!
^^ The parties interviewed who went to trial were all in small claims but there is no
reason why their motive for choices cannot be extrapolated to general claims.

It is

interesting to note that although three were not satisfied with the outcome they were
satisfied with the procedural fairness of the mediation process which was described as fair
and equitable, less stress than going to court and a non confrontational environment. One
party felt he was forced mto mediation and was unhappy as a result of that and with the
outcome. However he thought the mediation process was conducted in a fair manner.
This is in contrast to those interviewed who had gone to trial. None of those who were
unhappy with the outcome were happy with the process and two winners were unhappy
with the process. However some of those who did settle at mediation had found that the
other party had reneged on the agreement and were worried about the difficulty of then
enforcing it. In these the mediator apparently had not put in train a procedure to monitor
the agreement. Procedures exist to readily convert such an agreement into a judgment but
those interviewed were not aware of this. If the system is to work a simple procedure to
ensure the agreement can be enforced is essential. Subject to this, the clear impression is
that for some mediation is a process with which they are far more comfortable and which
offers flexibility and other advantages over the trial process. In general claims the cost
implication are only of major significance if cases that otherwise would have gone to trial
settle at mediation.

Lawyer interviews
The interviews of lawyers were conducted by the author. The profile of lawyers
interviewed and the questions around which the interviews were based are set out in
Appendix E. Some were interviewed in their offices and some by telephone.
There was a positive attitude to mediation. Where they had direct experience of clients
using mediation they reported a high success rate in achieving settlement and satisfied
clients. In small claims there were no significant cost savings but where settlement have
been achieved in general claims it was the view that this saved the client substantial costs.
The attitude to the requirement that clients attend the first directions hearing was
contradictory. It is clear that corporate clients who are repeat users of the court regard the
requirement as wasteful of their time. The case has already been through a collection
agency where compromise was investigated and in any event they tend to a view that they
are right and there is nothing to compromise. This negativity is reflected in the attitude of

debt collecting solicitors to the requirement.

However they complained that the

requirement that the defendant attend is not rigorously enforced and they do advise their
clients that they should be prepared to conq)romise as the court will expect that. One
commented that lawyers get in the way of settlements and it is best to leave the clients
alone together. They can only do this as a result of the requirement that they be there.
Another, commenting on a similar requirement in higher courts thought that not enough
time was spent on this first directions hearing and the best way to bring parties to
settlements earlier was by careful judicial management at the front end.

Indeed he

suggested only a short form of pleading occur until after this process to avoid expense on
those cases that do settle. A lawyer from a medium sized practice that acted for both
corporate repeat users and private commercial clients confirmed the corporate users' view
that personal attendance was wasteful of their time but thought personal attendance can be
valuable to a private client particularly if the magistrate explains the process and risks.
"Clients who are unrealistic may listen to a magistrate where they will not accept my
advice." The comment was made that the requirement of client attendance would expose
lawyers who were incompetent or ill prepared.

None of the lawyers I interviewed

admitted that the clients' attendance affected them.^^^ It was a common comment that the
parties were not actively engaged in the process and just sat in the body of the court
wondering why their time had been called upon just to be passive spectators.

It was a widely held view of the lawyers that having magistrates rather than court staff
conduct the directions hearings was a benefit. It was suggested there would be a similar
benefit if they also conducted conciliation conferences. The Federal Court practice of the
trial judge taking control of the case from the outset was favourably commented on by
several lawyers.
Most lawyers said the information pamphlets had no effect but one lawyer said that he
gave all his clients a standard letter of advice covering the same issues upon receiving
instructions. Interviews of parties disclosed generally their lawyers had advised them of
the option of mediation and the information given to them at the directions hearing was
sufficient for them to understand the choice of mediation that was being offered. The

This is probably fair comment because I selected competent lawyers to interview.

pamphlets were generally accepted as readily understandable but there are several
indications that the policy of ensurmg that parties clearly understand the litigation process,
the alternatives and the cost implications of both were not yet fully effective.
It is clear that the new process has significantly reduced the costs to a large number of the
parties by successfully encouraging settlements at the directions hearing stage. The
proportion that had settled by this stage had increased 21/2 times under the new procedures
to 35%. It is not clear exactly what caused this result. The significant changes were the
involvement of magistrates at the directions hearing, the personal attendance of the parties,
a conscious attempt to better inform parties of the litigation process, the cost implications
and the option of mediation. From the interviews it is clear that the application of these
policies has been imperfect and there is reason to be optimistic that the significant success
in enabling settlements to occur earlier can be further improved upon. There is resistance
to the new procedures from repeat users but the results justify the imposition upon them.
Mediation contributed about a further 2% of earlier settlements. It has been most
favourably commented on by those parties that used it and it clearly is a very usefiil
alternative to the conventional trial process.

CHAPTER 6
AN EVALUATION OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCEDURE
Lawyers are excluded from small claims with the obvious result that the costs to the
litigants are substantially reduced. ^^^ They are also a departure from the usual adversary
process. The trial is conducted as an inquiry and the court is not bound by the rules of
evidence. The court is obligated to explore any avenues to reach a negotiated settlement. ^^^
Until May 1996 the magistrate at trial attempted both this negotiation and if that failed the
inquiry and judgment. A review of the small claims process from a plaintiff's point of
view was conducted in 1992.^^® Repeat parties, eg retail stores, were excluded. Eight
focus sessions were conducted with different groups with a maximum of twelve persons.
Both positive and negative experiences were reported with it being evident that the
experience was highly dependent on the court personnel rather than the system. The major
dissatisfaction was with the enforcement processes. These were completely changed in
July 1992.^^^ These concerns are outside the scope of this research. It was suggested that
the option of mediation should be offered well before and separate from the trial. Parties
did not like attempts to settle at the trial. There were no complaints recorded about the
cost of the proceedings.
In response to concerns about the confusion and resentment caused by magistrates at trial
^^^ Section 38 of the Magistrates Court Act prohibits representation by a legal practitioner
except where another party is a legal practitioner, the parties agree or the court thinks a
party would be unfairly disadvantaged if he or she was not represented. An insurer
subrogated to the rights of a party can represent that party. The rules of court allow legal
fees to be recovered only for the preparation andfilinga claim at the rate of $20 +10%
up to a maximum of $200. Witness fees of $30 -$40 are allowed. Cost scale 3 is for small
claims and is reproduced in Appendix H.
Section 38 Magistrates Court Act.
^^^ Bodzioch, Foster and Carr, Small Claims Review (May 1992) an mtemal courts
department document.
^^^ Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 proclaimed 6/7/92. It is doubtfiil whether this Act
has successfully dealt with these concerns which have their origin in the fact that the court
leaves the initiation of enforcement procedures to the plaintiff, deals with many debtors
who are defacto bankrupts (you can't get blood from a stone) and is on occasions
unsuccessful in extracting money from a small group of debtors who cynically prevaricate
and delay until the plaintiff is exhausted.

trying to settle cases as well as then deciding them, in May 1996 this attempt at negotiating
a settlement was separated from the trial. All defended cases are referred to a directions
hearing, conducted by senior, LEADR trained, non judicial court staff. At the directions
hearing the possibility of settling the case is discussed. If that fails mediation is offered to
parties that want it or the case is set for trial before a Magistrate.

There is a data base of the outcome of 3 months of defended small claims in 1992.^""^
Comparative data for small claims defended from 1 May to 30 September 1996 has been
collected and analysed on the same basis. There is some analysis of this data in Appendix
D. The profile of the cases in both samples is similar. Of the 537 cases in the 1992 sample
23.8% were motor vehicle property damage claims, 69% debt and the balance evenly
spread over other case categories. The 507 cases in the 1996 sample were divided between
15.6% motor vehicle property damage claims, 76% debt and the balance again spread
evenly.

Under the old system 23% were finalised before trial leaving 77% that went to trial. 40%
of those were determined by hearing (ie 31% of the origmal sample). In contrast, under
the new system 17% were finalised before the directions hearing leaving 83% that went to
a directions hearing at which a further 31% were settled. At the time of data collection
(late September 1996) 11% of the original sample had no outcome ie they were adjourned
to a further directions hearing. Under the new system 48% had been settled by the end of
the new directions hearing. If the 11% all go to trial a maximum of 52% went to trial or
mediation compared to 77% under the system in 1992.

If all the 11% with no outcome

settle only 41 % will go to trial.

There are no legal cost unplications of this but it affects the parties' own costs because
lawyers are excluded from the process once the claim is commenced and defended. They
need to attend in person at both the directions hearing and the trial. They need not be as
well prepared and need not bring witnesses to the directions hearing. Under the new
system the number of cases which had to go to trial was reduced by more than 25%. For
these parties the system was cheaper because they only had to attend a directions hearing.
^^ These were prepared at the same time and for the same purpose as that for general
claims discussed in chapter 5 above.

It was certainly quicker because the directions hearing was 3 to 4 weeks after the defence
was filed and presumably it was less stressftil than a trial. This was the view of the ten
parties who settled at a directions hearing and were interviewed. With one exception who
felt she was pressured into a settlement they were impressed by the promptness and
informality of the process. One said she was very in:q)ressed with the time involved and
the system compared to her home country Germany. The trade off is that although a lesser
number of cases went to trial under the new system, in those that did the parties had to
attend twice, at the directions hearing and the trial. This was as many as 50%. Overall
this must have increased the parties' own costs. Ten parties who had to attend both at a
directions hearing and a trial were interviewed. Three thought the directions hearing was
useful to define the issues and meet the other parties. Another three thought it was not
personally useful for them but acknowledged that it had a usefiil role in the process to
better inform parties, give an opportunity to settle and one noted that it would be a
necessary step if parties wanted to use mediation. The other four did not think it was useful
to them personally nor as part of the process. The 25% who settled or obtained a default
judgment saved some expense by not having to prepare for trial and generally were pleased
with the process. Up to 50% incurred the cost of an extra attendance. They were fairly
evenly split between those who thought the directions hearing was either personally useful
or at least potentially useftil and those who thought it was not. Thus 25% of the original
sample thought the directions hearmg had no use.
Delay is not directly related to costs^"^^ but the reduction in delay is so marked it justifies
reporting. In 1996 nearly 50% of cases were finalised within 50 days compared with only
about 10% in 1992. This is a result of the matters finalised at the early directions hearing.
It is this reduction in the time to finalise cases where there is no substantial contest that
probably caused the favourable response to the new procedure revealed m interviews of
debt collecting lawyers. Whereas under the previous system a default judgment at trial
was not obtained until some ten weeks after the defence was filed, now it is obtained 3 or 4
weeks aft^r the defence.
Lawyers interviewed accepted that a small claims procedure was necessary because it was
See the discussion Australian commentaries in chapter 3.

just not economic to act for parties over small money disputes and generally thought the
system worked well. The comment was made by one debt collecting solicitor that they
usually had to contact their clients to find out what happened which was an indication of
acceptance of the result. There were comments to the effect that rough justice was on
occasions handed out. One lawyer feared that there was a tendency by magistrates to split
cases down the middle which could unfairly advantage the common enough defendant with
a speciously attractive but unmeritorious counterclaim. None said that the present limit
should be reduced but several felt that the quality of result was too variable to permit a
substantial increase in the limit. In fact the appeal rate is quite low. An appeal (known as
a review) lies against the decision of a magistrate to the District Court. In the Magistrates
Court between January 1993 and March 1994 there were 4927 small claims defended. A
review was sought inl81(3.5%) and the original decision was varied in 49 (1
Costs
can be awarded on reviews which may be a disincentive to seeking one but even allowing
for that this low rate of review suggests parties generally accept the decisions in small
claims and where they do not the result is usually upheld.
Larger firms who charge on a time charge basis acknowledged that it was not economic for
them to act for a party in a dispute for less than $10,000 and on that basis felt the small
claims limit could be increased to that sum. There is a trade off here. There is no doubt
that being competently represented at trial advantages a litigant and makes the job of a
magistrate much easier because the factual and legal issues are likely to be better
canvassed. Without lawyers the quality of the result depends much more upon the ability
and the tune a magistrate has to devote to each case. The problem is that the cost of a
lawyer to take a matter to trial may well be $5,000 to $10,000. Recently in SA a new
class of small claim, 'minor statutory proceedings', has been introduced. If the case
exceeds $5,000 it remains a small claim unless one of the parties elects to have it removed
to the general jurisdiction. The effect of this is too recent to assess yet.

From internal Courts Administration Authority data.

CHAPTER?
AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES IN THE CONVENTIONAL LITIGATION
PATH DESIGNED TO REDUCE COSTS
Costs were identified as a major impediment to access to justice when the magistrates
adopted their own civil procedures in 1992. The policies to remedy this for cases that
proceed along the conventional trial path can be grouped convenientiy under three
headings, the fixed cost scale, the cost penalties and case flow management designed to
minimise activity on all cases but especially those that settle.
In the 1992 sanq)le of cases from which statistics have been drawn, only 74 out of 379
went to trial (20%) and the trial commenced in only 27 {1%)}^^ If 80% settle by the end
of the conciliation conference, activity designed principally for orderly disposal at trial
should not be imposed on these and should be actively discouraged. It is of course
necessary that sufficient work be done to have a realistic assessment of the prospects of
success if cases go to trial. There is no doubt that a well prepared lawyer is far better
placed to negotiate than one who is not but that happy state can be achieved without doing
a great deal of the work that is specific to trial preparation. With this in mind the fixed
and predictable cost scale is designed to act as a disincentive for any activity that is not
essential because that will not be recoverable from the other litigant and will therefore
impact on the cost to the lawyer's own client.
The cost penalties are additional to those usually found in rules of court and are
specifically designed to discourage inflated claims and counter claims and to encourage the
defendant to make realistic offers.
Parallel with this stringent view on cost goes the obligation to ensure that the practice and
This figure of 10% or less actually going to trial is the same in other jurisdictions. See
fotnote 24 - Williams found that of cases issued in the samples in VIC and QLD !0% go
to trial and Resnick reported that the USA experience has been that 4% of cases go to
verdict.
^^ The operation of these is discussed in chapter 2 under the heading The conventional
path.

procedures of the court impose no unnecessary activity on the lawyers. How successful
have these policies been?

With the exception of corporate repeat users of the court most litigants have little
understanding of the litigation process and the cost implications of it.^"^^ The court has
recently attempted to redress that by the information process discussed in the previous
chapter but it is clear from the litigant and lawyer interviews that the decisions about the
activity done on each file are made by the lawyers not the parties. Accordingly the focus
of this investigation has been to assess the impact of these policies on lawyers' attitudes to
the work necessary in a Magistrates Court case.^"^^
The fixed rate cost scale
Lawyers are well aware of the scales and the party/party costs they provide. A specialist
cost solicitor was of the view that the scale is generous for routine debt collections, about
right for personal injury claims and too low for complicated commercial disputes.

The actual basis of charging varies widely. Most firms mterviewed charge on a tune
charge basis recorded on a computer in six mmute bites. Partners charge out at $150 to
$250 per hour. Some charge on the Supreme Court scale and one specialist debt collector
charges the party/party scale in whichever jurisdiction the case is issued. He reported that
at least one other firm does the same for some matters and he believes the Magistrates
Court scale encourages efficiency and firms will specialise in particular types of disputes
which due to efficiency they will be able to do lucratively charging scale costs to the client.
Most now give advice to clients about their basis of charging and confirm that m
w r i t i n g . T h e information to clients about the potential gap between actual costs and
party/party costs is often not clear, although one lawyer said his firm had recently started
giving detailed advice about that. One debt collecting firm sends bills out monthly so that
clients are at least aware of their liability for actual costs.

The firm that charges

^^^ Corporate repeat users are an interesting exception. They use the bargaining power of
volume work to put their work up for tender on special rates based on fixed rates for jobs.
This is a basis of charging more akin to the Magistrates Court scale than the usual basis
which is time charging or activity based scales such as the Supreme Court scale.
^^ Details of the lawyers interviewed and the questionnaire are set out in Appendix E.
Professional conduct rules require them to do so.

party/party has nothing to advise. There is no gap. Where there was a gap it was
estimated that party/party costs were for one firm as little as 50% of their actual charge to
their client, for some about 15% and for some nearly adequate to cover the actual client
costs. The reported size of the gap was closely correlated to the reported rate of charging.
The gap of course lessened once claims exceeded $20,000 as the scale is largely a
percentage scale so the absolute level of costs increases with the amount of the claim.
Most acknowledge that the scale is a disincentive to doing any unnecessary work on their
Magistrate Court files. Some asserted that they do the necessary work on every file but
then acknowledged that they were forced to write off more work as not chargeable than
they would in higher jurisdictions. Either way the scale drives costs to the party down. In
the former instance there is a risk that the amount of work done will be reduced to a level
that prejudices the result. No one would admit to that and it is my impression sitting in the
court that this is not the case. On the contrary my subjective impression is that the low
cost lawyers are focused and don't get "lost in the trees". There is of course nothing to
prevent a party and his or her lawyer agreeing to a level of service beyond that
compensated by the scale. However the party bears the excess over the scale personally
even if he or she is successful. The cost penalties use the gap between party/party and
actual costs to encourage realistic offers. One criticism of the scale was that it was not as
much as a disincentive to the immeritorious defendant who knew the cost risk he or she
was taking whereas in the higher courts the cost risk was unknown and higher. A plaintiff
can counter this by making an early offer slightly below the full clahn. If it is not accepted
and the plaintiff proves the full claim he or she is then entitled to full solicitor client
costs.However as noted below this was unattractive to at least one personal injury
lawyer.
The cost penalties
All lawyers interviewed were aware of these. A plaintiff personal mjury lawyer felt they
were unfairly weighted against the plaintiff. "It is pretty unattractive to offer to accept less
than you think it is worth when the only advantage is the recovery of solicitor client costs.
On the other hand the defendant who is well financed can offer something low but near
the mark and that puts enormous pressure on the plaintiff. " A defendant personal injury
^^ Rule 59.

lawyer felt they did not have much effect because the costs of preparing for trial are so
high they are a more important consideration than the cost penalties.Most matters that
proceed to trial do so for good reasons and the cost penalties will not overwhehn those
good reasons. A sole practitioner in the field said that he was most afraid of the cost
penalties and thought they could be capricious in their results. They had the effect on him
of making him consider very carefully what the plaintiff is really worth, rather than
lodging an ambit claim.
Debt collecting lawyers did not think the rules had much effect except on occasions to
penalise a 'shonky' counter claim. Other lawyers thought they could have a powerful
effect especially those at the upper end of charging rates who are concerned to recover the
gap between the court scale and their own costs. This encouraged rule 59 offers slightly
below the expected recovery.The penalties were said to be useful to encourage clients
with unrealistic expectations to make sensible offers. It was clear that these rules do
influence lawyers to encourage their clients to make strategic offers and to avoid making
extravagant claims.

Case flow management policies that do not encourage pretrial activity
Personal injury lawyers thought any difference in the costs of litigation in the Magistrates
Court was a consequence of lesser monetary claims being amenable to easier investigation
(eg a $500 gratuitous service claim will not be contested seriously in evidence but a several
thousand dollar claim will bear closer scrutiny). Any difference in costs is a consequence
of the fact that larger monetary amounts are worth arguing over, not any practice or
procedural differences. In contrast it was the unanimous view of all lawyers m other fields
that it was significantly cheaper to litigate in the Magistrates Court. Debt collectors say
they separate claims to keep them in the magistrates jurisdiction or if they cannot and the
claim is not much beyond the limit they advise their client to abandon the limit to take
advantage of the lower costs and more prompt disposal available in the Magistrates Court.
^^^ The second bill in Appendix I is an mdication of the way costs and disbursement can
overwhelm the dispute in personal injury claims. It is atypical being contested on all
grounds because the defendant thought the claim was totally without basis and contested
it vigorously. How to conduct trial in such matters in a cost effective way is another
challenge.
If the plaintiff recovers more than a rule 59 offerfiillsolicitor client costs from 14 days
after the offer are recovered. Rule 59 is reproduced in Appendix H.

When asked to identify the reasons they identified less pretrial hearmgs and activity in the
Magistrates Court and less interlocutory battles over discovery and pleadings. "People
don't take as many points and do less preparation." Several identified the fixed rate cost
scale as discouraging activity because the activity does not have its own reward in costs.
Pleadings were especially identified as an area where the Magistrates Court is cheaper. ^^^
It was said by several that rule 46.20^^^ requests for a more explicit pleading are routinely
used as a weapon in a battle of attrition on costs and to cause delays of up to six months in
the progress of a claim. This type of pleading argument does not occur in the Magistrates
Court. This is instructive because the magistrates rules adopt the Supreme Court rules for
pleadings.^^^ The difference is nothing to do with the rules, it is the culture of the court
and this is driven by the fixed rate cost scale. "The scale discourages bull." "Magistrates
discourage fights about pleading. This saves a lot." It became obvious that the fixed rate
scale was an all pervasive influence over the conduct of matters. The case flow
management policies in the rules allow the lawyers to avoid unnecessary work but the
incentive to avoid it is the scale. Although not asked directly, it was clear that if an activity
based party/party scale applied the pretrial activity would quickly blossom into
complicated, protracted and expensive fights over pleadings discovery and other matters.
These would increase the costs to the parties for no obvious benefit.
Consistent with the conclusion that the practice of the Magistrates Court allows cost
savings were the answers to the question about the stages in the litigation when the costs
are incurred. They are incurred mainly upon taking instructions and issuing the claim,
little in the interim and the largest amount in the weeks leading to trial. The view was
widely held that costs are generally incurred later in the process in the Magistrates Court
than in higher jurisdictions. It was said that a lawyer can minimise the work on a file in
the expectation it will settle, "skate through", and if it does not then settle do the work
necessary to clean it up for trial. Others abhorred this approach. They prepare all their
^^^ References to the practice m higher jurisdictions are inevitable as people discuss the
alternatives to talk their way through a topic. I have not done any research on the efficacy
of the procedures of the higher courts and these comments are not intended as a criticism
of those procedures which no doubt are appropriate in view of the higher amounts m
dispute and other factors.
^^^ This rule entities a party to request more explicit pleadings.
^^^ Rule 24. The relevant Supreme Court rule is rule 46.

cases thoroughly but still find that litigation in the Magistrates Court is cheaper and very
few costs are incurred between the filing of the claim and for those cases that don't settle,
getting them ready for trial. It was noted that debt collection claims are usually issued
without much work done on the file and with these the first substantial work is done if a
defence is filed. The scale is thus higher than the actual costs for those claims that are
filed but not defended.
Data from SGIC^^ on the average costs per file closed in 1995 analysed by the court in
which the case was filed supports these subjective views that it is cheaper to litigate in the
Magistrates Court.
finalised ar PTC
av. costs Supreme $13,346

finalised

after PTC finalised at trial

$17,145

$34,498

Ct.
av costs District Ct.

$ 4,736

$ 6,005

$12,973

av costs Mag. Ct.

$2,977

$3,450

$6,375

This data however contradicts the view that the costs are incurred later in the Magistrates
Court. The costs on files setded at the Pre Trial (conciliation) Conference as a percentage
of costs of files finalised by judgment were 46% in the Magistrates Court, 36% in the
District Court and 38% in the Supreme Court. This may reflect the relatively higher
burden of the cost of medical reports in Magistrates Court claims. It is also not obvious
why there is such a cost difference between the Supreme and District Courts where
procedures are very sunilar. One explanation may be that a larger claim wiU bear closer
scrutiny and the work done and costs expand accordingly. An activity based cost scale
encourages this.
It was noted in the previous chs^ter that under the new procedures adopted in May 1996
15% of cases proceeded from the directions hearing to trial without a conciliation
conference. This was a small saving to parties of their own cost of attending and of the
cost of each of their lawyers attending the conciliation conference.^^^

^^ Internal SGIC data. There is a query on the accuracy of this data due to the inclusion
in it of data for cases settled by direct negotiation which one would not expect once
proceedings have issued.
^^^ See appendix I- plaintiffs bill of costs- the scale fee on a claim for $10,000 is $80
and the actual costs may be more.

The unambiguous conclusion from the interviews was that the policies in the magistrates
rules have been successful in limiting the legal costs of litigation in the court. The fixed
rate cost scale has been the driving force in maintaining a cost saving culture in the court.
The other policies have allowed that to happen but as the pleading experience demonstrates
the same rules in different environs can lead to vastly different results. There is no reason
to quarrel with the view of the lawyers interviewed that the difference is primarily the
result of the cost scale which does not reward activity. It is also clear that the cost
penalties have discouraged excessive ambit claims and have been a factor in encouraging
realistic and on occasions strategic offers. Some of these must have led to settlements
occurring which reduced the costs to the parties.
Finally there is a simple aid to facilitate the proof of damage and that is briefly evaluated
next.

Proof of the cost of repairs to, or loss of, property
In claims for motor vehicle damage a sunple reform which patently saved costs for
plaintiffs was to allow a repair quotation, account or receipt which was attached to the
claim when it was served to be sufficient proof to allow judgement to be signed on a claim
which has not been defended.If the case is defended the attached quotation, account or
receipt is receivable as evidence at the trial.^^^ Prior to this rule, where a case of this type
was not defended the plamtiff could sign judgment on the issue of whose fault the damage
was but then had to apply to the court to assess the amount of the damage. This involved
serving another set of documents on the defendant including a notice of assessment and not
just the relevant repair quotation, account or receipt but also affidavit evidence from the
repairer. There was a hearmg at which the court satisfied itself that these documents were
in order, served and the amount claimed was reasonable. A lawyer or the plaintiff had to
^^^ Magistrates Court (civil) rules 1992 rule 61. A similar procedure exists m the
Victorian Magistrates Court.
Rule 95 (2). If however the defendant contests the validity or reasonableness of the
quote it would be necessary to call further evidence to establish the reasonableness of the
cost of the repairs.

attend at this hearing. ^^^ The party costs in 1992 for the assessment were from $80 to
$300^^^ and the actual costs may well have been higher. The assessment was required and
costs likewise were incurred in small claims. The new procedure avoids these costs. No
doubt there is an element of risk that repair quotations may be excessive but that risk
existed under the old procedure. A defendant wishing to contest the reasonableness of the
claimed cost of repair can still do so by contesting the original claim and stating in the
defence that it is the quotation that the defendant objects to. The new system is now
almost universally used and is now accepted as unremarkable. It clearly saves the plaintiff
in undefended cases of this type the costs of assessment and these are passed on to
defendants who are able to pay and becomes part of a long term debt collection against
those who cannot. In the financial year 1995/6 in the Magistrates Court SA there were
1716 small claim and 242 general motor vehicle property claims filed. ^^ Very few of the
defendants in these cases concede (they either contest or do nothing), and so in nearly all
the damages would have had to be assessed without the aid to proof in the rules. At a
median cost of $105 for each small claim and a median cost of $235 for general claims
these parties were saved a total of $237,050.^^^ This would be about on third of a million
dollars if indexed for inflation (the CPI has inflated about 40% since 1988) This is a small
but significant saving to parties achieved with no pain.

Section 108 Local and District Criminal Courts Aa 1926.
^^^ This is from an internal scale for magistrates operative from 30/9/88 as followsclaunupto$l,000-i5ö; $2,000 (small claims limit) - $130; $5,000-5770;
$10,000-i26Ö; $20,000- $300.
^^ Internal Courts Administration Authority statistics.
(1716 X $105) + (242 x $235)= $237,050.

APPENDIX A

TRIAL DELAY
MAGISTRATES COURT CIVIL DIVISION
ADELAIDE REGISTRY
The attached statistics are drawn from management information kept by the Chief
Magistrate and measure the time from the filing of a defence to the commencement of the
trial of a case which is not given special priority but proceeds through the pretrial process
without delay.

Magistrates Court Civil (Adelaide Registry) - delay in listing for trial in weeks

Jun-89
Dec-89
Jun-90
Dec-90
Jun-91
Dec-91
Jun-92
Dec-92
Jun-93
Dec-93
Jun-94
Dec-94
Jun-95

small claim

19
19
12
11
11
11
8
12
16
15
10
8
11

general claim
22
27
36
32
27
28
30
25
19
17
16
19
16

small claim

general claim

APPENDIX B

PERFORMANCE STANDARD
MAGISTRATES COURT CIVIL DIVISION
ADELAIDE REGISTRY
Two sources of statistics are available here.

One set have been collected by the

Supervising Magistrate on a manual basis for management purposes.

They show a

snapshot of the age of the cases m the list at the tune when the statistics were collected.
Every defended case currently in the list has been analysed on the basis of how long it has
been in the list since the defence was filed. The data and a graphical analysis of it is
attached. This data can be misleading because it shows what is left in the list, not the age
of cases when they were finalised.

The other information is an analysis of a group of cases commenced between 1 September
1992 and 30 November 1992 which were defended. Each of these files was tracked to its
ultimate disposal and the manner of disposal and delay in achieving that was recorded.
The delay is analysed on the attached sheet.

Magistrates Court Civil (Adelaide Registry) - cases analysed by time in trial list

31/8/93
<8months
8-12months
>12months

523
40
15

7%

<8months
8-12months
>12months

3%

90%

31/12/93
<8months
8-12months
>12months

731
29
21

Cases filed 9-11/92 and defended
<270 days
321
270-365day£
22
>365 days
36

30/4/95
<8months
8-12months
>12months

523
68
49

APPENDIX C

SGIC STATISTICS
I record my thanks to the Commission for making this statistical data available to me. I
especially thank Barry Parker who convinced the computers that the data could be made
available m this form.
The data used is set out on the following numbered sheets. Sheets 1 to 5 are discussed in
Chapter 4, An evaluation of the ninety day preaction notice and Sheet 6 is dicussed in
Chapter 3, Some policy issues in reducing the cost of litigation.
sheet 1- legal costs as a percentage of total payments 1986/7 to 1994/5
sheet 2 - age of claimfilesclosed 1989/90 to 1994/95
- actions commenced 1989/90 to 1994/95
sheet 3 - proportion of costs to payout 1991/2 and 1994/5
sheet 4 - accident statistics in SA
sheet 5 - casualty accidents compared to claims commenced
sheet 6 - plaintiff medico - legal costs as a percentage of payout.

SHEET 1

SGIC- legal costs and total payments
1986/7
11698241
Plaintiff legal cost
7598037
Defendt legal cost
19296278
total legal cost
162761688
Total payments
4.66
D cost% total payt
total cost%payt
11.86

1987/8
1988/9
12216857 15266649
9544422 11898588
21761279 27165237
158928450 176376690
6
6.75
13.69
15.4

1989/90
18461165
14498705
32959870
185501305
7.82
17.77

1990/1
19613332
15809360
35422692
189992135
8.32
18.64

1994/5
1993/4
1992/3
1991/2
11988848
13409545
22805668 18501732
17738005 14337290 10412612 10965944
40543673 32839022 23822157 22954792
201091998 185883681 143274316 159576679
6.87
7.27
7.71
8.82
14.38
16.62
17.67
20.16

Legal costs as a percentage of total payments
30 J
20

1'

10
0

I

f-'tii?*
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ID cost% total payt 0total cost%payt

' ' M

SHEET 2
SGIC- average time OTP claim file open for claims closed during period
Average no. of months claim file open
closed 89/90
closed 90/91
closed 91/92
closed 92/93
closed 93/94
closed 94/95

28.15
31.04
31.04
31.18
26.59
25.12

Average age of claim files closed

closed
89/90

closed
90/91

closed
91/92

SGIC- number of new CTP actions per year
year
Actions commenced
1989/0
1990/1
1991/2
1992/3
1993/4
1994/5(projected)

closed
92/93

closed
93/94

3204
2931
2284
1709
1256
815

Actions commenced
3500
3000
2500
2000 +
1500
1000 +
500
0
a>
oo

o>

CO

o>

Oi

closed
94/95

SHEET 3
SGIC-proportion of costs to CTP payout 1991/2
Assessors, investigators &poiice reports
Medico-legal costs
Payment to claimants

2135464
44153902
154802632

1%

22%

77%
I Assessors, investigators &police reports
I Medico-legal costs
I Payment to claimants

1994/5
Assessors, investigators&police reports
Medico-legal costs
Payment to claimants

2317894
26174603
131084182

1%

16%

83%
(Assessors, investigators&police reports
I Medico-legal costs
I Payment to claimants

The above have been calculated from the following data
1991/2

1994/5

total payout
assessors and investigators
police reports
defendants' legal costs
plaintiffs' legal costs
medical reports

201,091,998
2,119,849
15,615
17,738,005
22,805,668
3,610,229

159,576,679
2,284,680
33,234
10,965,944
11,988,848
3,219,811

net payout

154,802,632

131,084,182

SHEET 4

Vehicle accidents SA
fatal accidents
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

259
230
206
201
186
166
142
191
145

casualty accidents all accidents
9244
8619
7881
7815
7606
6506
6258
6467
6410

43440
42240
37373
40067
39844
35961
35756
37295
38833

NB no figures are available for all accidents 1993- the figure used is an average of 1992/4
NB in 1988 the damages reporting limit was raised from $300 to $600
NB figures are for accidents not actual casualties or injured people
Source- SA Dept Road Transport, office of road safety.

Accident statistics- SA
45CXXD
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SHEET 5

Casualty acxiidents compared to claims commenced with SGIC

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

casualty accidents claims commenced
9244
8619
7881
7815
7606
3204
6506
2931
6258
2284
6467
1709
6410
1256
815

NB casualty accidents are per calendar year, claims commenced per financial year

casualty accidents compared to claims
commenced

SHEET 6
SGIC 1991/2- Plaintiffs' medico- legal costs as a percentage of CTP payout to Plaintiffs
P medico-legal cost
24557602
CTP payout to Plaintiffs
179375849

SGIC 1991/2- Ps' medico-legal costs as percentage of CTP payout to represented plaintiffs
P medico-legal cost
18951671
Payout to represented Ps
109362390
note figure for payout is from a back calculation not original data

APPENDIX D

COMPARATIVE DATA ON THE STAGE OF FINALISING CASES

GENERAL CLAIMS- analysis of percentage finalised by directions hearing.
379 cases commenced 1/9/92- 30/11/92 and defended
to conciliation conference
319
84.20%
finalised by any means
54
14.20%
other
6
1.60%
total
379
100%

1/9/92- 30/11/92
finalised by any

m^ns
14%

to conciliation
conference

84%

219 cases defended between 1/5/96- 31/7/96
to conciliation or mediation
finalised by any means
direct to trial
still at directions and other
total

83
77
33
26
219

38%
35%
15%
12%
100%

1/5/96- 31/7/96
still at
directions and
other
direct to trial

12%

15%

to conciliation
or mediation

38%

finalised by any
mœins

35%

SMALL CLAIMS- percentage finalised before trial and delay

finalised before trial or directions
finalised at directions
other
total

1992- % finalised
before trial

1992 sample 1996 sample
122
84
0
158
415
265
537
507

1996- % finalised
before trial

3
77%

percentage finalised in 50 days
percentage finalised in 100 days

1992 sample 1996 sample
9
46.5
46
73

NB-1992 sample slightly overstated by the inclusion of some data at 60 & 120 days

M percentage finalised in 50
days
0 percentagefinalisedin 100
days

1992
sample

APPENDIX E
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LAWYERS
Eight lawyers were interviewed by the author loosely following the form of the
questionnaire below. They were chosen by the author as experienced, competent and of
sufficient seniority to feel free to be frank with me. They were and I thank them for that.
They all practice to a significant extent in the Magistrates Court. They come from a major
firm doing everything except family law and little criminal and both plaintiff and defendant
work, a middle sized commercial and general firm doing both plaintiff and defendant
work, a small general practice with a plaintiff personal injury emphasis, a small specialist
debt collecting firm, a medium size general practice with a half its work debt collecting, a
specialist costmg practitioner with a general and debt collecting practice and two medium
to large firms with a personal injury emphasis, one for the plaintiff and one for the
defendant.
Questionnaire

for Lawyers -

What is the profile of your firm? Number of partners, staff solicitors, PI emphasis.
Plaintiff or Defendant?
On what basis do you charge your/this client, what explanation is given to the client of
the basis of charging, the expected overall costs, the level of party/party costs and
their relationship to solicitor/client costs, and to what extent is/was this information
updated as the case progresses/d?
Have clients of yours chosen mediation. If so why, if not why not? Did that settle the
case? If yes did what was your charge (mcluding disbursements) at that pomt and did
that save your client costs? If no what did the mediation cost your client and were
there any benefits from it?
How many times have you been through the new process of requiring the client to
attend the first directions hearing?
What advice did you give your client about the new process?

What effect did the requirement that your client attend the first directions hearing
have- on you?
on your client?
Did the court information on costs/ mediation/ the conventional trial path influence
your client or you in choosing mediation, settling the case or trial? In what way?
What effect did the mtroduction of the 90 day rule (rule 106(8)) which had effect in
this court from the beginning of 1994 have on PI claims?
Does the magistrates cost scale influence the amount of work done on a file? In what
way?
What is the effect, if any, of the cost penalties in rules 52 &53 and rule 59 ?
Small claims- what do you charge your client for small clauns? Are the results
satisfactory? Do you think the small clauns limit should be mcreased? Why?
What are your costs of conducting a claim and at what pomts are they
incurred(instructions to defend,filmgdefence, counterclaun, pretrial, trial)?
What is the relationship between party/party costs and solicitor/client costs? Does this
become greater the longer the litigation goes on?
What are the differences m costs of personal injury litigation, debt coUectmg, other?
At what stage are disbursements mcurred - filmg defence, pretrial, trial? What are
the types of disbursements. Are there differences between PI and other types of
litigation?
Is it cheaper to conduct litigation m the Magistrates Court rather than m the Supreme
and District Courts? If yes how much and why?
How could the cost of pleadmgs, discovery, 3rd party discovery be reduced?

Do you use the aid to proof of damage and does that save costs? How much?
Is the cost of multiple adjournments of pretrial hearings a significant cost burden?
What proportion of your cases in the Magistrates court actually go to trial?
What can be done to assist early settlement?
How many cases settle when independent counsel is briefed?
indépendant cousel and would it be useful to brief counsel earlier?

Do you brief

What are the medico costs (per report, giving evidence, other)? Who selects your
clients experts? How many do you use? Do you ever discuss with SGIC the selection
of an expert acceptable to both parties?

APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRES FOR PARTIES
Interviews of parties to cases were conducted by Courts Administration Authority
personnel as part of an assessment of the introduction of mediation. Questions were also
asked about the cost implications of the new process that the party experienced. The
parties were chosen at random with some alterations from the original selections being
necessary due to some of those first selected not being available. More plaintiffs than
defendants were interviewed because depite efforts to contact both it proved to be more
difficult to contact defendants and arrange an interview with them.

There were

insuffient available to sample parties in general claims who declined mediation and went
to trial.

SAMPLE 1 - Those who attended mediation and settled (small or general) - 9 parties
were interviewed
Name of Interviewer
Call Date
Call Time (am/pm)
Could the respondent be contacted
If no,

[ ] Yes

Callback 1 Date

Tune

Callback 2 Date

Time

Callback 3 Date

Time

[ ] No

Survey
Hello my name is
are

I work for the Courts Administration Authority and we

currently conducting a telephone survey about the option of mediation for resolving
minor and general clauns in the Civil Division of the Adelaide Magistrates Court.

You should
have recently received a letter about the evaluation and that you would be contacted.
Do you have approximately 30 minutes that I can talk to you about this matter?

(If yes continue, if no arrange time to callback.)
Callback Date

Time.

I understand that you were recently involved in a small/general claim action. We
believe that
your feedback about your experiences would be of great assistance
to the Authority in providing a higher standard of service. Your feedback will also
assist in evaluating any additional services that may be required to meet the future needs of
the courts consumers.
All information you provide will be treated confidentially.
Would you like to participate in this survey?
1. INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED PRIOR TO CONTACT WITH
RESPONDENT
1. Name of,
Plaintiff [ ]
Defendant [ ]
2. Action Number
3. Action:
[ ] 1. Minor Civil
describe)

[ ] 2. General

[ ] 3. Other (please

4. Type of Claim:
[ ] 1. Motor vehicle accident [ ] 2. Property
[ ] 3. Building
[ ] 4. Personal injury
[ ] 5. WorkCover
[ ] 6. Defamation
[ ] 7. Contract
[ ] 8. Other
5. Date Defence was lodged
6. Date of Directions Hearing
7. Date of mediation
8. Name of mediator
2. OUTCOME
9. Could you please tell me the terms of the settlement reached at mediation?

10. How satisfied were you with the mediated outcome?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
11. Please explain what factors contributed to your satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the mediated outcome?

3. CASE DURATION
12. How satisfied were you with the time it took for your matter to be resolved?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
13. Please explain what factors contributed to your satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the time it took for your case to resolve?

4. CASE COST
14. Was one of the reasons you chose mediation because you thought it
would
cost you less than having the matter settled at a trial? Please explain.

15. How important was cost in your decision to choose mediation?

16. Do you believe that you saved money by resolving your claim through
mediation? Please explain.

5. OUTCOME PARTICIPATION
16. How satisfied are you with the level of input you were able to have in
deciding on the mediated outcome?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
Please explain

6. USE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION (for general claims only)
17. Did you have legal representation at the mediation hearing?

7. OPERATION OF THE MEDIATION PROCESS
18. Why did you choose mediation? (prompt for more than one answer, "Was
there
any other reason that you chose mediation?")

19. At what stage of your claim were you made aware of the option of mediation?

20. Do you have any comments on the information provided about mediation
at the directions hearing? (Eg. Was the information detailed enough to
assist you to make an informed decision?)

21. How convenient was the location and thne that the mediation was held?
(Eg Would it have been helpful if the mediation had been held outside normal
office hours or at a suburban Magistrates Court - Christies Beach, Elizabeth,

Holden Hill, Mt Barker, Port Adelaide?).

8. MANNER IN WHICH THE MEDIATION WAS CONDUCTED
22. During the mediation did you feel that the mediator treated both sides equally
or
favoured one side more than the other? Please explain.
23. Do you have any comments about the proficiency of the mediator?
24. In retrospect, do you believe that choosing the mediation path was the right
or wrong decision? (Eg. If you were involved in a similar dispute, would you
choose mediation?) Explain.
25. Would you like to make any additional comments on the use of mediation for
dispute resolution?
9. PREVIOUS LODGEMENT - The next few questions are about previous
experience with civil claims m the Magistrates Court. This is to see whether people
think that the new system is an improvement over the previous system.
26. Have you previously been involved in another civil claim within the Adelaide
Magistrates Court Civil Division?
27. Action:

[ ] 1. Minor Civil

[ ] 2. General [ ] 3. Other (please describe)

28. Type of Claim:
[ ] 1. Motor vehicle accident [ ] 2. Property

[ ] 3. Building

[ ] 4. Personal injury

[ ] 6. Defamation

[ ] 7. Contract

[ ] 5. WorkCover
[ ] 8. Other

29. How long ago was the claim?
30. Do you think that the new system where parties are offered mediation is better
than the previous system were mediation was not available? Please explain?

Thank you for your time and assistance

SAMPLE 2 - Small Claims settled at Directions Hearing-10 parties were
interviewed
The same preliminary matters set out in the first sample were attended to.
1. INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED PRIOR TO CONTACT WITH
RESPONDENT
1. Name of,

Plaintiff [ ]

Defendant [ ]

2. Action Number
3. Type of Claim:
[ ] 1. Motor vehicle accident [ ] 2. Property

[ ] 3. Buildmg

[ ] 4. Personal injury

[ ] 6. Defamation

[ ] 7. Contract

[ ] 5. WorkCover
[ ] 8. Other

4. Date Defence was lodged
5. Date of Directions Hearing
2. OUTCOME
3. Could you please tell me the terms of the settlement reached at the
directions hearing?

7. How satisfied were you with the outcome of the directions hearing?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
8. Please explain what factors contributed to your level of satisfaction with the
outcome from the directions hearing?

3. CASE DURATION
9. How satisfied were you with the length of time it took for your case to be
resolved?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
10. Please explain what factors contributed to your satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the time it took for your case to be resolved?

4. CASE COST
11. Do you believe you saved money by resolving your case at the directions
hearing?

12. How satisfied were you with the costs of resolving your case at the
directions hearing?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied

[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
Please explain.
5. OUTCOME PARTICIPATION
13. How satisfied were you with the level of input you were able to have
in the settlement reached at the directions?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
Please Explain.

6. USE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
14. During the course of your case, did consult a lawyer or some kind of legal aid?
If so, which one?
15. Did your legal representative advise you to settle at the directions hearing?
16. Please explain your reason for settling at the directions hearing?
7. OPERATION OF THE DIRECTIONS HEARING
17. Previously, directions hearings were not offered for minor civil claims. Do
you believe that directions hearmgs assist the resolution of small claims?
Why/why not?
18. Would you say the directions hearing was

[ ] very useful
[ ] useful
[ ] not useful, for the resolution of small claims?
8. PREVIOUS LODGEMENT - The next few questions are about previous experience
with civil claims in the Magistrates Court. This is to see whether people think that the new
system is an improvement over the previous system.
19. Have you previously been involved in another civil claim within the Adelaide
Magistrates Court Civil Division?
20. Action:

[ ] 1. Minor Civil

[ ] 2. General [ ] 3. Other (please describe)

21. Type of Claim:
[ ] 1. Motor vehicle accident [ ] 2. Property
[ ] 3. Building
[ ] 4. Personal injury
[ ] 5. WorkCover
[ ] 6. Defamation
[ ] 7. Contract
[ ] 8. Other
22. How long ago was the claim?
23. Do you think that the new system where parties attend a direction hearing before
proceeding to trial is better process? Please Explain.

24. Are there any other comments you would like to make?
, Thank you for your time and assistance.

SAMPLE 3 - Small claims, declined mediation, judgement given at trial- 9 parties
were interviewed.
The same preliminary matters set out in the first sample were attended to.
1. INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED PRIOR TO CONTACT WITH
RESPONDENT
1. Name of,
Plaintiff [ ]
Respondent [ ]
2. Action Number
3. Type of Claim:
[ ] 1. Motor vehicle accident [ ] 2. Property
[ ] 3. Building
[ ] 4. Personal injury
[ ] 5. WorkCover
[ ] 6. Defamation
[ ] 7. Contract
[ ] 8. Other
4. Date Defence was lodged
5. Date of Directions Hearing
6. Date of trial
2. OUTCOME
7. Could you please tell me the terms of the trial outcome?
8. How satisfied were you with the outcome of your case at trial?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
9. Please explain what factors contributed to your satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the trial outcome?
3. CASE DURATION
10. How satisfied were you with the length of time it took from when the
defence was lodged and when judgment was given at trial?

[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. unsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
11. Please explain what factors contributed to your satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the time it took for your case to be resolved?
4. CASE COST
12. Prior to trial, did you know the likely costs involved in pursuing a small
claim in the Adelaide Magistrates Court Civil Division?

13. In retrospect, do you believe you would have saved money by opting for
mediation and attempting to resolve the matter at an earlier stage of the
litigation process? Please explain.

5. OUTCOME PARTICIPATION
14. How satisfied were you with the level of input you were able to have in the
judgment given at trial?
[ ] 1. very satisfied
[ ] 2. satisfied
[ ] 3. imsatisfied
[ ] 4. very unsatisfied
Please explain

15. Would you like to have had greater input into the outcome of your case.

Why/why not?

6. REASON FOR DECLINING MEDIATION
16. Can you tell me what you understand by the term mediation?
17. At what stage of your claim were you made aware of the option of mediation?
18. Do you have any comment on the information provided about mediation at the
directions hearing? (Eg. Was the information detailed enough to assist you to make
an informed decision?)
19. Why didn't you choose mediation?
20. Are there any other comments you would like to make?

7. DIRECTIONS HEARING
21. As part of the process of resolving your dispute, you had to attend a
directions hearing before you could proceed to trial. How useM was the
directions hearing?
[ ] very useful
[ ] useful
[ ] not useful
Please explain.

22. Do you think it would be better if the matter had gone straight to trial? (in which
case your matter would probably have been resolved earlier) Please explain.

Thankyou for your time and assistance.

APPENDIX G
INFORMATION PAMPHLETS
The Magistrates Court makes available to parties information pamphlets on legal costs,
mediation, the conventional litigation path and preparing for a minor civil trial. These are
reproduced below.

LEGAL COSTS MAGISTRATES COURT:
CIVIL DIVISION
Introduction
All too often people embark on a civil claim in the Magistrates Court without a proper
appreciation of the risks and likely costs, especially if they lose the case. The purpose of
this pan^hlet is to assist people who are considering taking a matter to court to calculate
the likely costs beforehand so that they can make an informed decision about whether or
not to go ahead with a lawsuit.
The pamphlet also explains the rights of parties in relation to recovering legal costs and
outlines the non-trial options available for settling civil claims in the Magistrates Court.

Party/Party Costs
A party represented by a lawyer who wms a case in the Magistrates Court is entitled to
recover some of their legal costs. This cost entitlement is called 'party/party costs'.
Detailed cost schedules available from court registries can be used to estimate the likely
party/party costs of a claim before the claim is started.

Cost Scales for General Claims
Claims for amounts greater than $5 000 are called general claims. There are two cost
scales for general claims: one for routine actions and the other for complex actions.
On the routine scale in a trial that lasts only one day, a plaintiff (ie the party starting the
claun) who wms is entitled to recover legal costs equal to about 25% of the judgment. For
example, if a magistrate awards a plaintiff $10 000, the defendant will be required to pay
the plaintiff that amount as well as about $2 500 towards the plaintiff's legal costs. A
defendant (ie the party against whom the claim is made) who wins can recover legal costs
equivalent to about 25% of the plaintiff's unsuccessfiil claim. For example, a losing
plaintiff who claimed $10 000 from a defendant would be required to pay the defendant the
amount specified m the judgment plus another $2 500 to help cover the defendant's legal
costs. In complex actions, the proportions rise to about 30%.
The proportions provided above are only intended as a guide. If a claim involves many
adjournments of directions and conciliation hearings the party/party costs are likely to be
greater than these percentages. Also, claims frequently mvolve the additional cost of expert
reports (eg medical reports or engmeers' building reports) and/or fees for expert witnesses;
these charges can add considerably to the cost of a claim.
Where a trial lasts more than one day, the daily cost of legal representation can be
calculated from item 24 in the cost schedules that are available at registries.
If a party wishes to claim costs on the complex scale, they must notify the other party in
writing. The advantage to the successful party of claiming costs on the complex scale is
that they can recover a greater proportion of their costs. If the other party contests the
notice to claim costs on the complex scale, it is left to the magistrate at trial to decide
which scale will apply.

Minor Civil Action
One way of minimising legal costs is to have a claim heard as a 'small claim' or 'minor
civil action'. Minor civil actions are claims for amounts of $5 000 or less. Under the
provisions of the Magistrates Court Act, lawyers are not usually permitted to represent a
party at the trial of a minor civil action so no party/party costs are payable. Wimess fees
are allowed, but in minor civil actions these are usually only $30 to $40 (see Scale 3 in the
cost schedules available from registries).
It is important to note that claims of more than $5 000 can also be heard as minor civil
actions, providing the other party agrees.

Lawyers' Charges
Before instructing a lawyer to represent you, it must be realised that even if you win the
claim, the legal costs you are entitled to recover may be much less than the amount your
lawyer actually charges. If you lose and costs are awarded against you, not only will you
have to pay your own solicitor-client costs but the other person's party/party costs as well.
It is essential that you discuss your lawyer's charges before you get him/her to commence
or defend a claim for you. To avoid problems later, get written confirmation of the fees
and charges.
It is important to remember that there is no economic point in hiring a lawyer to win a
claim if you have to pay all your judgment as well as the party/party costs to your lawyer.
Nor is there any sense hiring a lawyer to defend a claim if you will end up owing more to
your lawyer than the claim against you. There is also little point spending a lot of money
on a claim against a defendant who has no money or assets to pay your judgment. Not only
will you not be able to recover your judgment, but you will still have to pay your lawyer.

Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Civil Division of the Magistrates Court has recently introduced the option of

mediation as an alternative means of dispute resolution for minor civil actions and general
claims. Mediation is provided by professionally trained court staff with accredited
qualifications in mediation. It provides parties with an opportunity to negotiate a mutually
agreeable resolution to a dispute rather than having to resort to court adjudication.
If the parties in a dispute decide to try and resolve the matter by mediation, a mediation
conference will be held soon after the defendant has filed their defence. At the conference
the mediator attempts to identify the parties' interests (rather than their legal rights) and
bring them to a consent settlement that will accommodate those interests.
In addition to the speedier resolution of claims, mediation has the potential to provide
considerable cost savings for litigants because the matter is resolved before most of the
costs are incurred.
Offers to settle
The rules of the Magistrates Court, Civil Division, have been designed to encourage
parties to make and accept reasonable offers to settle out of court. For general claims, the
chief forum for negotiating out of court settlements is the conciliation conference, which is
the last oppormnity parties have to settle a matter before trial. A party who fails to make or
accept a reasonable out of court settlement can incur considerable legal cost penalties.
The following example illustrates the cost penalties that can be incurred by an unsuccessful
defendant: A plaintiff notifies a defendant that they are willing to accept an out of court
setflement of $10 000. The defendant, however, does not agree to that sum and the matter
goes to trial. The plaintiff subsequently wins the case and is awarded $11 000. The
defendant is required to pay not only the judgment but all the plaintiffs legal costs from 14
days after the acceptance offer was made. That is, the defendant is penalised for failing to
agree to the plaintiffs reasonable offer to settle out of court.
Similarly, plamtiffs who refuse to accept a defendant's reasonable offer to settle out of
court are subject to cost penalties. Defendants who offer more than or equal to the
judgment against them are entitled to party/party costs from 14 days after the offer was

made (Rule 59).
It is important for parties to make realistic offers at the final conciliation conference as
further cost penalties can apply (Rules 52 and 53).

For more information about these cost penalties, the relevant rules are included in the cost
schedules available at the Registry.

MEDIATION
The Civil Division of the Magistrates Courts has recently mtroduced the option of
mediation for resolving claims and proceedmgs lodged in their courts.

This pamphlet has been prepared to help you understand MEDIATION, the advantages it
has to offer, its advantages over gomg to trial and where it fits mto the court trial process
in Magistrates Courts.

WHAT IS A MEDIATION?
Mediation is an alternative way of resolving disputes or claims. It provides parties with an
opportunity to negotiate a mutually agreeable resolution to a dispute rather than having to
resort to court adjudication.

The mediation is conducted by a neutral third party

(mediator) who seeks to identify the parties' interests (rather than their rights) and to bring
them to a consent settlement that will accommodate those interests.

The mediator is

neutral and does not decide which party is right or wrong or tell you what to do.

WHO WILL MEDIATE?

Mediation will be conducted by senior court staff who have received formal trainmg.
Magistrates are also available during the mediation process to assist with direction on
matters and questions involving law. Should you not wish to use the mediator provided by
the Magistrates Court, you can ask the Law Society to recommend a mediator.
WILL IT COST ME ANYTHING?

Mediation in the Magistrates Courts is provided without charge.

This is one of the

important advantages of mediation over more traditional means of dispute resolution such
as a trial.

Ill

WHEN IS MEDIATION USED?
Your case can be referred to mediation if you ask for it at the first hearing called a
Directions Hearmg. This hearing is set down once a defence has been filed in your matter.
It should also be noted that whilst mediation may not be the preferred option at the
directions hearing it can still be an option at a later stage. Should either party wish to have
their matter mediated at a later stage, you should contact the court where advice can be
provided as to the procedure for applying to have the matter listed for mediation.

Costs and Flexible Results

BENEFITS OF MEDIATION

In most cases, an early resolution through mediation means all parties save costs.
Mediation also allows you to reach more flexible solutions in a non-threatening
environment free of legalistic language and process which better suit your needs. An
example of this could be that if your matter involved faulty work and a claim for monies to
have the work corrected, possible outcomes may be:
an agreed adjournment to enable work to be carried out by either or both parties to
assist with the resolution of the matter. In the event that the work is performed to
the satisfaction of parties, the parties may not have to attend at the next hearing with
the matter then considered to be settled;
binding agreements endorsed by a court that are enforceable in a court should either
or both parties not comply with the agreement
agreement between parties for the payment of an amount of money by one of the
parties in full and final satisfaction of the matter, with the payment of the sum of
money being within a timeframe agreed between the parties.
Mediation allows for parties to reach agreed settlements with solutions of a wide and
varied nature depending on the proceedings.

Speedier Resolution
Mediation is usually quick - helping you to get an early resolution before things get out of
hand. At the very least, mediation should assist in defining the issues that need to be
resolved should the matter proceed to the next step and eventually trial.

Control of Outcome
you have more control over the process and the outcome. This means that the agreement
is more likely to be honoured.

Privacy and Confidentiality
The mediation is confidential and any agreement an also be kept confidential by
agreement.
WHERE ARE MEDIATIONS HELD?
Mediations will be held in venues separate from the court. The rooms used are in a
comfortable non-threatening environment where the opportunity is provided to have a
relaxed and informal discussion involving parties, legal representatives if and where
necessary and the mediator. Separate rooms are provided adjacent to the mediation room
for private discussion during the mediation process in the event that you wish to have a
discussion with your legal representative.
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MEDIATION?
Should mediation be successful, a number of options are available to the mediator and the
parties who have sought the mediation. The result of the mediation can be recorded in a
number of ways.
judgment for a sum of money agreed upon by the parties
an agreement can be recorded
case adjourned while parties carry out what they have agreed to do
case can be dismissed
a mixture of these alternatives
WHAT HAPPENS SHOULD A PARTY OR PARTIES NOT ATTEND?

Should a party not attend mediation, the matter will be referred to a Stipendiary Magistrate
for a default judgment to be entered. Should both parties not attend, the matter will be
referred to a Stipendiary Magistrate for direction. The matter may be dismissed.
ADVANTAGES OF MEDIATION
Costs and Flexible Results
In most cases, a successful resolution through mediation means all parties save costs,
you can reach more flexible solutions to suit your needs.
Speedier Resolution
Mediation is usually quick - helping you to get an early resolution before things get
out of hand.
Control of Outcome
You have more control over the process and the outcome. This means that the
agreement is more likely to be honoured.
Privacy and Confidentiality
The mediation is confidential and any agreement can also be kept confidential by
agreement.
ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS
CONTACT (address and phone no. supplied)

THE CONVENTIONAL LITIGATION
PATH
Preparing for the Conciliation Conference
Now that you have attended the first directions hearing, you and your lawyer should now
prepare for the next step in the litigation process, which is the conciliation conference.
The court can give you a date for this about a month from the first directions hearing.
Between now and the conciliation conference you and your lawyer should assess the
evidence that you will be able to brmg to trial and exchange information with the other
parties. This is done through processes known as "discovery" (listing all relevant
documents) and "inspection" (which allows each side to see the documents). Each party
can ask for further and better particulars of the claim or defence. If other parties may have
caused the problem that is the subject of the litigation, they can be joined by third party
proceedings.
As a result of this process you and your advisers should have a good grasp of your
prospects of success by the conciliation conference. The first purpose of that conference is
to attempt to arrive at a settlement or compromise of the action. If that can be achieved,
then the matter is at an end.
If the matter cannot be settled, then it will go to trial. The court will able to fix a trial
date, usually about eight weeks after the conciliation conference.

Matters Proceeding to Trial
The court will expect you to think about how to simplify or limit the issues for trial.
Trials are very expensive and should focus on the real issues and not on peripheral issues.
You should work out ways of avoiding calling unnecessary evidence and limit the number
of witnesses.

The Magistrates Rules provide several ways of dealing with routine matters, for example:
using a Notice to Admit Facts (Rule 76); wimess statements (Rule 80); and affidavit
evidence (Rule 99). Each of these procedures can bring evidence before the court without
actually calling witnesses.
You can ask questions of the other side before trial (interrogatories), again to avoid the
necessity to call evidence.
Experts
If you are going to rely on experts, it will be necessary to obtain a written report from
them and give that to the other side within three weeks. It is highly desirable that experts'
reports be agreed. They are very expensive to call as witnesses.
Offers in Settlement
It is very important that you make realistic offers to the other side to settle the matter.
These should be formally recorded at the conciliation conference or else it can affect your
entitlement to or liability for party/party costs.

PREPARING FOR A MINOR CIVIL
ACTION TRIAL
Lawyers
The general rule is that lawyers are not allowed at the trial. There are some exceptions
such as if one party is a lawyer, or both parties agree, or if the court thinks a party would
be unfairly disadvantaged if not represented (Section 38(4) of the Magistrates Court Act
1991).
You will need to present the evidence yourself. The court will assist you, as these trials
are conducted as an inquiry by the court rather than an adversary contest.

Witnesses
The court is not bound by the Rules of Evidence and can act without regard to
technicalities and legal form. However, the court will require evidence on key issues.
Although you may present to the court a written statement of a witness, the court will not
attach much weight to it without the witness bemg present to be asked questions about the
witness's version.
There are some ways in which you can avoid the expense of bringing witnesses to court.
You may need to prove the value of damage that you have suffered (for example the cost
of repairing your motor vehicle, a front fence or a cracked driveway, etcetera). If you
gave copies of quotes or invoices to the other party with the claim, that is sufficient unless
the other party said they are contesting the quote or invoice. You should bring to court
any quotes or invoices. You should have more than one quote.
If the other party is contesting the amount of your quote or invoice, then you may have to
call the witness who gave you the quote to show that it is fair.
You can avoid calling witnesses by giving a Notice to Admit Facts (Rule 76), a witness
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statement (Rule 80) or serving an affidavit on the other side (Rule 99). Each of these
procedures requires you to take special steps several weeks before the trial. Court staff
can advise you on these steps.

Experts
If you are going to rely on an expert report, you should send a copy of this to the other
side not less than 21 days before the trial date. You may use one of the above procedures
to avoid the necessity to call the expert, unless the other side contests the report.

Third Party Claims
If you admit that you owe some or part of the plaintiff's claim but say that someone else
was also at fault or should be paying the plaintiff's claim, then you should take steps to
join that party to the proceedings. Usually this is done by a Third Party Notice. You must
not leave this until the trial but must do it straight away. You will need leave of the court
to do this.

Interpreters
If you or any witness whom you are calling would be helped by having an interpreter, the
court will provide an interpreter at no charge to you. You must tell the Court Trial
Section straight away that you need an interpreter and any special dialect.

Costs, Witness Fees and Interest
Costs are kept to a minimum in minor civil actions, but the magistrate may award the
winner compensation for the cost of issuing the claim, including lawyers' costs and
nominal witness fees. The magistrate may also allow a successful party interest.

APPENDIX H
COST SCALES AND COST RULES MAGISTRATES CIVIL RULES 1992
THIRD SCHEDULE- COSTS
SCALEI: ROUTINE ACTIONS
SOLICITOR'S FEES

ITEM

$1-$10 000

$10 001-$20 000

$20 001-$60 000

70% of Supreme
Court Scale

80% of Supreme Court
Scale

90% of Supreme Court
Scale

2 Pre-action Application.

80

120

150

3 a. Notice of Demand and
registration of Lien and
registration and Notice of
Demand under the Workers Liens
Act 1893 and other notices of a
like nature.

100

150

200

50

75

100

4% of the
judgment sum

4% of the judgment sum
up to a maximum of
$1200

1 Application in the nature of an
application for an interim
injunction.

b. Notice of withdrawal/satisfaction
of Lien and registration.
4 Filing an action (other than under
Rules 37 and 38) provided that a
defence and coimterclaim will only
be allowed as one item on the
higher scale applicable.

4% of the
judgment sum

As allowed by the Court

5 Filing an action under Rules 37 and
38.
6 Routine request (of the nature of
request for discovery, inspection).
Item includes costs for perusal of
reply.

40

70

100

7 Request requiring drafting (of the

100

150

200

$ 1 - $ 1 0 000

$10 0 0 1 - $ 2 0 000

$20 0 0 1 - $ 6 0 000

200

300

400

100

150

200

50

100

150

11 Simple affidavit.

30

40

50

12 Lengthy affidavit where it was

80

100

150

10% of the

10% of the

10% of the judgment

judgment sum

judgment sum

sum up to a maximum

nature of particulars,
interrogatories). Item includes costs
for perusal of reply.
8 Notice to admit facts, filed offer,
payment into court or other notice
requiring particular instructions.
Item includes costs for perusal of
reply.
9 Reply to Request under item 6 and
7 response to notice under item 8
and Personal Injury particulars
(Rule 68 Form 22). Making
discovery (where required) for each.
10 Preparing filing and serving an
Application including proof of
service.

required.
13 All aspects not otherwise specified
of and incidental to preparing for

of$3000

trial including proofing witnesses,
advice on evidence and law
(solicitor and counsel) and

•

delivering brief to counsel.
14 Arranging witnesses for trial - per

30

40

50

30

40

50

30

30

30

witness (includes obtaining and
filing and serving expert reports).
15 Issuing and serving siunmons to
witness.
16 Filing request (Form 18) not
otherwise provided for.

ITEM

$1 - $10 000

$10 001-$20 000

$20 001-$60 000

50

50

50

a. Personal where required

60

60

60

b. Other

30

30

30

150

175

200

20 Attendance for inspection - any
party.

80

100

120

21 Attendance at Listing Conference,
Directions Hearing or routine
Application.

40

60

80

22 Attendance at Application
requiring special argument or at
conciliation conference.

80

120

150

17 Request for Investigation or
Examination Summons including
attendance at the hearing.
18 Service of any document which is
not in the usual course served by
the Court and is not otherwise
specified:

19 Preparing bill for taxation
(includes attendance on taxation).
ATTENDANCE AND COUNSEL FEES

23 To advise on compromise or
settlement for a person under
disability.
(a) Where quantum only is in
dispute
(b) Where quantum and liability
are in dispute
24 Attendance as counsel at trial
(includes fee on brief and
refreshers):

m

150

230

300

200

300

400

ITEM

FIRST DAY
SUBSEQUENT DAY
ATTENDANCE FOR
JUDGMENT
25 Attendance on an appUcation to set
aside a warrant.

$1-$10 000
500
300
50

$10 001-$20 000
600
400
80

$20 001-$60 000
800
500
100

20

20

20

NOTES
A

The Court may allow any larger or lesser amount for any item and any amount in respect of any other
matter that the Court allowed at the time of making any order.

B

All the above items are all inclusive of all costs for all incidental and necessary activity and advice
for each item to the intent that no costs will be allowed in addition to the costs set forth for each item
nor for anything not itemised.

C

For the purposes of items 4 and 13, the costs calculated must be rounded to the nearest $ 10.

WITNESS FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS
1.

Witness Fees

Same aUowed $1 - $60,000

$350 or such other amount ordered
Professional scientific or other expert
by the Court
witnesses per day.
$150
(ii)
Other aduh person per day.
$50
(iii)
Persons under 18 years of age per day.
If the witness is released before or is
required to attend after the luncheon
break on any day, half a day will be allowed.
(iv)
A witness will in addition be allowed:
Where the witness is normally resident more than 50
(a)
Travel expenses:
km from the trial court at the rate of 45 cents
per km or the least expensive return air fare
whichever is the lesser or the cheapest

(i)

(b)

Accommodation expenses:

combination of both.
In the discretion of the taxing officer where
the witness is required to be absent from his
or her normal place of residence overnight for
accommodation and sustenance per night
$120 or such larger amounts allowed by the
court at the time of or before judgment.

Photocopying

50 cents per page

STD calls

Actual cost

All Court Fees and other fees and payments to the extent to which they have been properly and
reasonably incurred and paid. But excluding the usual and incidental expenses and overheads of a
legal practice and in particular excluding postage, Telecom charges (non STD), courier expenses.
Expert Reports

$300 or such other amount ordered
by the Court.

THIRD SCHEDULE
COSTS
SCALE 2: COMPLEX ACTIONS
SOLICITOR'S FEES

•

1 Application in the nature of an
application for an interim
injunction.

$1-$10 000
...

$10 001-$20 000

70% of Supreme 80% of Supreme Court
Court Scale
Scale

2 Pre-action Application.

80

150

3 a. Notice of Demand and
registration of Lien and
registration and Notice of
Demand under the Workers Liens
Act 1893 and other notices of a
like nature.

100

150

50

75

b. Notice of withdrawal/satisfaction
of Lien and registration.
4 Filing an action (other than under
Rules 37 and 38) provided that a
defence and counterclaim will only
be allowed as one item on tiie
higher scale applicable.
5 Filing an action under Rules 37 and
38.

6% of the
judgment sum

$20 001-$60 000
Other than actions to
which Item 5 applies,
costs in actions of this
class will be allowed on
the basis of 90% of the
Supreme Court Scale

6% of the
judgment sum

As allowed by the Court

1

ITEM

$1-$10 000

$10 001-$20 000

6 Routine request (of the nature of
request for discovery, inspection).
Item includes costs for perusal of
reply.

40

70

7 Request requiring drafting (of the
nature of particulars,
interrogatories). Item includes costs
for perusal of reply.

100

150

8 Notice to admit facts, filed offer,
payment into court or other notice
requiring particular instructions.
Item includes costs for perusal of
reply.

300

400

9 Reply to Request under item 6 and
7 response to notice under item 8
and Personal Injury particulars
(Rule 68 Form 22). Making
discovery (where required) for each.

150

225

10 Preparing filing and serving an
Application including proof of
service.

50

100

11 Simple affidavit.

30

40

12 Lengthy affidavit where it was
required.

80

100

13 All aspects not otherwise specified
of and incidental to preparing for
trial including proofing witnesses,
advice on evidence and law
(solicitor and counsel) and
delivering brief to counsel.

15% of the
judgment sum

15% of the
judgment sum

14 Arranging witnesses for trial - per
witness (includes obtaining and
filing and serving expert reports).

30

40

15 Issuing and serving summons to

30

40

$20 001 - $60 000

witness.
16 Filing request (Form 18) not
otherwise provided for.

30

30

17 Request for Investigation or
Examination Summons including
attendance at the hearing.

50

50

a. Personal where required

60

60

b. Other

30

30

150

175

20 Attendance for inspection - any
party.

110

160

21 Attendance at Listing Conference,
Directions Hearing or routine
Application.

40

60

22 Attendance at Application
requiring special argument or at
conciliation conference.

150

200

150

230

200

300

18 Service of any document which is
not in the usual course served by
the Court and is not otherwise
specified:

19 Preparing bill for taxation
(includes attendance on taxation).
ATTENDANCE AND COUNSEL FEES

23 To advise on compromise or
settlement for a person under
disability.
(a) Where quantum only is in
dispute
(b) Where quantum and liability
are in dispute
24 Attendance as counsel at trial
(includes fee on brief and
refreshers):

FIRST DAY

600

700

SUBSEQUENT DAY

400

500

ATTENDANCE FOR

50

80

20

20

JUDGMENT
25 Attendance on an application to set
aside a warrant.

NOTES

A

The Court may allow any larger or lesser amount for any item and any amount in respect of any other matter
that the Court allowed at the time of making any order.

B

All the above items are all inclusive of all costs for all incidental and necessary activity and advice for each item
to the intent that no costs will be allowed in addition to the costs set forth for each item nor for anything not
itemised.

C

For the purposes of items 4 & 13, the costs calculated must be rounded to the nearest $10.

WITNESS FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS

1.

Witness Fees

Same aUowed $1 - $60,000

(i)

$350 or such other amount ordered

Professional scientific or other expert
witnesses per day.

by the Court

(ii)

Other adult person per day.

$150

(iii)

Persons under 18 years of age per day.

$50

If the witness is released before or is
required to attend after the luncheon
break on any day, half a day will be allowed.
(iv)

A witness will in addition be allowed:
(a)

Travel expenses:

Where the witness is normally resident more than 50 km
from the trial court at the rate of 45 cents per km or the
least expensive return air fare whichever is the lesser or
the cheapest combination of both.

(b)

Accommodation expenses:

In the discretion of the taxing officer where the
witness is required to be absent from his or her normal
place of residence overnight for accommodation and

sustenance per night $120 or such larger amounts
allowed by the court at the time of or before judgment.
2.

Photocopying

50 cents per page

3.

STD calls

Actual cost

4.

All Court Fees and other fees and payments to the extent to which they have been properly and reasonably
incurred and paid. But excluding the usual and incidental expenses and overheads of a legal practice and in
particular excluding postage, Telecom charges (non STD), courier expenses.

5.

Expert Reports

$300 or such other amount ordered by the Court.

SCALE 3: MINOR CIVIL ACTIONS

ITEM

so-$soo

1 Filing an action (if prepared and

$501-$1000

$1001-$2000

$2001-$5000

$20 plus 10% of the claim up to a maximum of $200

filed by a solicitor)
2 P I particulars

NIL

$30

$50

$80

3 Any attendance at Court by party

$30

$30

$35

$40

$30

$30

$35

$40

or solicitor (where solicitor is
entitled to attend)
4 Witness fees

[or actual charge by witness if allowed by Court]
5 Issue and serve simimons to

$30

$30

$30

$30

$25

$30

$35

$40

$20

$20

$20

$30

witness
6 Request for Investigation/
Examination summons including
attendance at tiie hearing
7 Any other request (Form 18) for
enforcement of judgment
8 All other court fees

as charged

9 Other disbursements

to the extent allowed by the Court

10 To advise on a compromise or
settlement for a person under
disability
(a) Where quantum only is in
dispute

100

100

100

100

150

150

200

200

(b) Where quantum and liability
are in dispute

(Debt collecting fees in addition to the above amounts are not allowed.)

NOTE

For the purpose of item 1 the costs calculated must be rounded up to the nearest dollar.

COST RULES
106 (1)

Unless the Court orders otherwise, a successful party in an action (other than a
minor civil action) is entitled on judgment to costs against an unsuccessful party, or
any other party that the Court may order, in accordance with the following principles:
(a) where judgment is in respect of an action for a sum of money (i) a successful plaintiff is entitled to costs on the relevant scale in the Third
Schedule applicable to the sum actually recovered;
(ii) a successful defendant is entitled to costs on the relevant scale in the Third
Schedule applicable to the sum claimed;
(b) where judgment is in respect of any other action - a successful party is entitled to
costs on the scale in the Third Schedule specified by the Court;
or
(c) where the action involved unusual difficulty or intricacy, or other proper cause
exists - a successful party is entitled to costs on such percentage of the Supreme
Court scale as the Court specifies.
(2)
In a minor civil action, a successful party is entitled on judgment to costs against
an unsuccessful party, or any other party that the Court may order, in accordance
with the relevant scale in the Third Schedule.
(3)
If, on the hearing of an action (other than a minor civil action), a successful party
recovers a sum of money being $2500 or less, that party is, unless for special
reasons the Court orders otherwise, entitled to costs only as if it were a minor civil
action.
(4)
Where proper cause exists, the Court may order that a successful party is entitled
to costs on a solicitor and client basis.
(5)
Unless the Court orders otherwise, a party is not entitled to costs on both a claim
and counterclaim in the same action.
(6)
Where there is no scale of costs applicable to an action or proceeding, the Court
may fix the appropriate scale of costs on application of the successful party or at
the request of the Registrar.
(7)
(a) A party may, by notice in writing served on all other parties, certify that
the nature of an action entitles the parties to costs on the relevant scale in
the Third Schedule as a complex action and, unless any other party by
notice in writing objects (including detailed reasons for the objection)

(b)
(c)
107 (1)
(2)

108 (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

within 21 days of the service of the notice, a party entitled to costs in the
action is entitled to costs on the relevant scale as a complex action.
If a party so objects, the relevant scale may be determined by the judicial officer
hearing the trial of the action.
In any other case, unless the Court orders otherwise, the relevant scale for a
complex action will not apply.
Unless the Court orders otherwise, where costs of proceedings are reserved, such
costs will abide the event.
The Court may make it a condition of an action proceeding any further that a party,
against whom an order for costs is made, must make payment of the costs within a
time fixed by the Court.
The Court may tax costs and allow costs in respect of the taxation.
If costs cannot be agreed, the successful party may file and serve on the
unsuccessful party a Bill of Costs in taxable form.
If the unsuccessful party does not file and serve a written notice of objection to an
item of the Bill of Costs (including detailed reasons for the objection) within 21
days of the service of the Bill of Costs, he or she will be taken to admit the item.
Where a written notice of objection is filed, the Registrar will fix, and give notice
in writing to the parties of, a date, time and place for the taxation, which may
proceed in the absence of any party.
Where costs taxed off represent 10%, or more, of the costs allowed and certified
on a taxation, the successful party is not entitled to any costs in respect of the
taxation.

109 The Court may award costs in respect of the exercise of its jurisdiction under the
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991.
110 The Court, notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to hear an action or proceeding, may
award costs as if it had jurisdiction.

COST PENALTIES
52 (1)

(a)

This rule applies to an action (other than a minor civil action) in which a party
obtains a final judgment (other than by consent) for a sum of money being less than
50% of the amount claimed by the party at either
the expiration of 21 days from the date of issue of a notice of trial;
or

(b)

the date of a conciliation conference,

whichever is earlier ("the operative date").
(2)

The costs to which the party is finally entitled will, unless at the time of giving
judgment the Court orders otherwise, be calculated in accordance with the formula:
CE

=

(2 X C X SJ)
SC

where CE is the costs to which the party isfinallyentitled
C is the costs of the party (as agreed or taxed)
SJ is the sum of money awarded by the judgment (exclusive of costs and interest)
and SC is the amount claimed at the operative date.
(3)

Where leave is granted to a party at a conciliation conference to amend the amount
claimed by the party to a specified sum, such amendment will, for the purposes of
this rule, be taken to be effective forthwith.

53 (1)

This rule applies to an action (other than a minor civil action) in which a party
obtains a final judgment (other than by consent) for a sum of money being 200%,
or more than 200%, the amount contained in -

(a)

an offer to consent to judgment filed in the Court;

or
(b)

a payment of a sum of money to the Registrar,

made before or at either (c)

the expiration of 21 days from the date of issue of a notice of trial;
or

(d)

the date of a conciliation conference

whichever is earlier ("the operative date").
(2)

The costs to which a party is finally entitled will, unless at the time of giving
judgment the Court orders otherwise, be calculated in accordance with the formula
CE

=

2 X C X (SJ-FO)
SJ

where CE is the costs to which the party is finally entitled, provided that CE does not
exceed the actual costs of the party on a solicitor and client basis
C is the costs of the party (as agreed or taxed)
SJ is the sum of money awarded by the judgment (exclusive of costs and interest)
and FO is the amount contained in
(a)

the offer;
or

(b)

the payment

and where in any case no offer or payment is filed or made then, for the purposes of this
rule, FO will be zero.

54

(1)

If the Court adjourns a conciliation conference, the operative date under rules 52
and 53 is postponed to the adjourned date.

(2)

Rules 52 and 53 are subject to rule 59.

(3)

If both rules 52 and 53 apply to the same action, neither will have effect.

(4)

In rules 52 and 53 the word "costs" means party and party costs (including counsel
fees) only and does not include disbursements, witness fees, experts' charges and
other expenses of and incidental to the conduct of the action.

OFFERS TO CONSENT AND PAYMENTS TO REGISTRAR

55

(1)

At any time before final judgment, a party may file and serve on any other party an
offer to consent to judgment.

(2)

The offer may be made subject to specified conditions.

(3)

An offer may relate to liability, quantum, matters in issue in the action or any
order, remedy or relief sought.

(4)

A party may file and serve a notice of withdrawal or variation of an offer which
has not been accepted.

(5)

A party may file and serve an acceptance of an offer.

(6)

A party may request the Registrar to enter judgment in the terms of an accepted
offer and the Registrar must enter it accordingly.

56

(1)

At any time before final judgment, a party may pay (with or without an admission

of liability) to the Registrar such sum of money as he or she thinks sufficient to satisfy the claim

against that party, together with the costs of the other party and interest up to the time of such
payment.

(2)

At the time of making any such payment, the party so paying must give notice m
writing to the other party of the payment.

(3)

The other party may file and serve a notice in writing accepting the sum of money,
and such notice will operate as full satisfaction of that other party's claim.

(4)

If no notice of acceptance is filed the sum of money must abide the event.

(5)

The Registrar must pay the sum of money to the party entitled to it in accordance
either with the notice of acceptance or the outcome of the event.

57

(1)

An offer to consent to judgment must specify whether the offer is inclusive of
costs and interest, or if the offer is not so inclusive it must specify what is offered
for the costs of the other party and what is offered for interest up to the date of
such offer.

(2)

If there is a failure to comply with sub-rule (1) the party accepting the offer is
entitled to costs and interest or whichever of costs and interest is not specified up
to the expiration of 14 days from the date of service of the offer in addition to the
sum offered.

58

The extent of an offer to consent to judgment or payment of a sum of money to the
Registrar must not be communicated to the judicial officer hearing the trial of the action
until final judgment is given.

59

(1)

In making an order as to costs at the trial of an action, the Court will take into
account any offer to consent to judgment, or any payment of a sum of money to the
Registrar, and any refusal or failure to accept such offer or payment.

(2)

Unless the Court for special reasons orders otherwise -

(a)

a plaintiff who obtains final judgment for a sum of money equal to or less than the
amount of any such offer or payment by the defendant, if the offer has not been
withdrawn before the time of judgment, is not entitled to costs after the expiration
of 14 days from the date the notice of the offer was served or the payment was
made and thereafter the defendant is entitled to costs on the scale applicable to the
amount claimed by the plaintiff;
and

(b)

a plaintiff who obtains final judgment for a sum of money equal to or more than
the amount of any such offer by the plaintiff, if the offer has not been withdrawn
before the time of judgment, is entitled to costs on a solicitor and client basis for
the whole action.

As at May 1996

APPENDIX I
BILLS OF COSTS
Juanita Doe v. Roe Van Nguyen
Taxation of Bill of Costs on Judgments for the Plaintiff of $10,000 - routine action

Item 4
Item 6
Item 8
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10

-

Item 11
Item 13

-

Item 20
Item 21
Item 22
Item 21
Item 24

-

Filing an action - 4 %
Request for discovery - includes perusing reply
Notice to admit facts
Filed offer
Responding to request for discovery
Preparing application for order for discovery including
proof of service
Simple affidavit
All aspects not otherwise specified of and incidental to
preparing for trial includmg proofing witnesses, advice
on evidence and law and delivering brief to counsel 10 % of judgment sum
Arranging witness for trial - two at $30 each
Attendance for mspection of documents
Attendance at directions hearing
Attendance at conciliation conference
Attendance on application to obtam order for discovery
Attendance of counsel at trial - trial went for one day
Attendance for judgment

$ 400
$ 40
$ 200
$ 200
$ 100

$1,000
$ 60
$ 80
$ 40
$ 80
$ 40
$ 500
$ 50

TOTAL PARTY/PARTY COSTS

$2.870

$ 50
$ 30

Witness fees and disbursements
Witness fees to aduh non-professional witnesses at $150 each

$ 300

Photocopying - 50 pages at 50 cents per page

$ 25

Filing fee on commencement of action

$ 91

Total costs and disbursements

$3^286

Party/party costs as percentage of judgment

28.7%

Party/party costs, disbursements and
witness fees as percentage of judgment

32.9%

A defendant's party/party costs in successfully defending a claim for $10,000 would be almost
identical. The definition in the rules of filing an action and filing a defence are that they are, for
costing purposes, the same and, as to the other items, one could expect a successful defendant to be
entitled to the same extent as a successful plaintiff. If the matter is a complex action, it is on the
second scale and the costs receive an uplift of two per cent in relation to item 4 - Filing an Action,
five per cent in relation to item 13 - Preparing for trial and also some dollar increase on the lump
sum fees. The percentage increase, therefore, is about eight per cent. Thus on a complex claim the
party/party costs, without disbursements, will be about 36% of the amount of the judgment (or the
unsuccessful claim) and, including disbursements and witness fees, will be about 40% of the
judgment (or the unsuccessful claim).
This sample taxation of costs is at the top end of the $1-$10,(X)0 scale. Consequentially, in relation
to lower judgment sums or claims within that segment of the scale, the lump sum allowances will
result in the cost bearing a slightly higher percentage to the judgment sum or claim than this

example. Professional witnesses and expert reports may substantially increase disbursements as the
example below demonstrates.
If the case runs for more than one day or if there is pretrial activity beyond that set out in the
example, then the party/party costs agam may exceed those set out above. An example of this is set
out below.
The following bill is an actual taxation of costs by a defendant (in effect SGIC) to a personal injury
claim where the plaintiff failed to prove any relevant accident had caused any injury. Note that the
disbursement for investigators is unusual, being for inquiry agents obtaining investigatory fihn and
related matters. The medical disbursements are also high. This case is atypical having been fought
hard and the plaintiff having changed solicitors several times resulting in many adjournments of
pretrial hearings. It is taxed on the lowest scale, the plaintiff having reduced his claim to $9,500.
Here the costs are 37% of the claim but with disbursements added they total 90% of the claim.

MAGISTRATES COURT (CIVIL DIVISION) SOUTH AUSTRALIA
BILL OF COSTS
Form

TRIAL COURT
199
Address

Office Use Only
Date of Filing
Date of posting
Of

ACTION No.

ADELAIDE
Education Centre
31 Flinders Street
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Phone No.

METHOD OF SERVICE
Registrar q
Party

Defendant's g^licitors

•

PLAINTIFF(S):

Deleted

SOLICITORS FOR PLAINTIFF:

Deleted

DEFEND ANT(S):

Deleted

SOLICITORS FOR DEFENDANT: Deleted
Address:

BILL OF COSTS THE ORDER OF fflS HONOUR Deleted SM
DATED deleted
Scale: Routine action.
TAXED
OFF
1
2

NO

Amount claimed $9,500

SCALE ITEM
4
6

3

4

8

5

9

6

9

7

13

8

7

9

15

ITEM
Filing Defence
Request and
perusal of
plaintiffs List
of Documents
Request and
perusal of
inspection of
documents
Notice to Admit
Facts
Making
discovery
Making
supplementary
discovery
All aspects not
otherwise
specified of and
incidental to
preparing for
trial
Request for
further and
better
particulars
Issuing and
serving
summons to
witness
(1) Dr deleted
(2) Royal

DISBURSEMENTS

CHARGES
$380
$40

$40

$200
$100
$100

$950

$100

$30

TAXED NO
OFF
10

11

Adelaide
Hospital
SCAT.E ITEM
ITEM
DISBURSEMENTS CHARGES
14
Arranging
witness for trial:
per witness
including
obtaining and
filing and
serving expert
reports:
$30
(1) Dr deleted
$30
(2) Dr deleted
$30
(3) Dr deleted
$30
(4) Mr deleted
$30
(5) Mr deleted
$30
(6) Mr deleted
$30
(7) Mr deleted
$30
(8) Mr deleted
(did not give
evidence but
arrangements
were made
for witness to
attend court
if required)
$30
(9) Mr deleted
(did not give
evidence but
arrangements
were made
for witness to
attend court
if required)
$30
(10) Mr deleted
(did not give
evidence but
arrangements
were made
for witness to
attend court
if required)
Attending
21
directions
hearing:
$40
24 July 1995
$40
1 September 1995

TAXED
OFF
12

NO SCATE ITEM
ITEM
DISBURSEMENTS CHARGES
22
Attending
conciliation
conference
and/or
attendance
requiring
lengthy or
special
argument:
6 October 1995
$80
$80
10 Novemberl995
1 5 December 1 9 9 5

12 April 1996
13

21

Routine
application
8 March 1991

$80
$80
$40

lAXED NO
OFF
14

SCALE ITEM
ITEM
DISBURSEMENTS CHARGES
24
Attendance as
counsel at trial:
(1) First day
$500
(2) Subsequent
$300
day
(3) Attendance
$50
for judgment
Sub Total
$3,480
Medical report
deleted
8 May 1992
$480
Medical report
deleted
2 2 November 1 9 9 4 $450
Radiological
report Drs
deleted
2 1 December 1 9 9 4 $430
Interpreter's
fees 9 November
1994
$60
Investigator's
fees
$2,093.60
Witness fee
deleted
$183
Witness fee
deleted
$350
Witness fee
deleted
$290
Witness fee
deleted
$350
Service fee of
subpoenas
$80
(17 July 1996)

(No. 14 continued)

$38L50

Photocopying
$2.16
STD phone call
$5,150.26
Sub Total
TOTAL
COSTS AND
DISBURSEMENTS
TAXED
DATED the

day of

$8,630.26
$8,630.26

1996.

AUowed at $8,630.26
THIS BILL OF COSTS is filed by
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